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Abstract
This thesis provides a descriptive analysis of whether New Zealand’s Domestic 
Purposes Benefits (DPB) and some Family Assistance programmes, mainly 
Family Support, creates incentives for low-income women to become single 
mothers. This concern arises from two sources:  firstly, eligibility criteria for 
many of these programmes require recipients to be single parents and secondly, 
assessment units for the welfare and income tax systems are different, resulting 
in relatively high Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) for low-income earners 
when they form a union with their partners.  
The Household Labour Force Participation Survey (HLFS) was used in the study 
over the period 1986 to 2004, during which significant welfare policy changes 
were introduced.  If welfare policies do affect incentives for child-bearing and 
partnering among actual or potential welfare recipients, we would expect these 
policy changes to have had an impact on these outcomes. Our results indicate 
that low educated women demonstrated a continuous decline in partnering up 
rates, whereas high educated women revealed an increase in the partnering up 
rates over this period. Nevertheless, there were no fluctuations in partnering up 
rates among low-educated women, in response to these policy changes. Also, the 
pattern in the childbearing behaviour is similar among low and high educated 
women. Hence, without a comprehensive regression analysis, this study suggests 
that the New Zealand DPB and FS, in conjunction with the income tax system, 
might not have had an impact on actual or potential beneficiaries’ decisions to 
form a union with their partner and to have a dependent child. 
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Chapter One: Introduction
 
 
1.1 Introduction
 
Welfare and income tax systems are considered to be most governments’ crucially 
important policy instruments. This is because most government expenditures are funded 
largely by collected income tax revenue. A portion of this government revenue is re-
distributed to some sections of the population through the benefit system and will thus 
crucially determine the standard of living of those beneficiaries1. Consequently, both of 
these policies impact all households either directly or indirectly2.   
 
When benefits, tax rates or other components of the respective systems change (such as 
abatement schedules and rates of the welfare system), the price levels and thus 
incentives that each individual faces, change as well. As a result, individuals will 
change their behaviour to respond to these changed incentives3. Consequently, these are 
important policy instruments that governments use to achieve certain social and 
economic objectives. Inadvertently however, some policies, which are designed to 
achieve some specific outcomes, may possibly have unintentional social and economic 
consequences through the distortion of incentives and efficiency losses. 
 
Welfare and tax policies, especially personal income tax, have been among the most 
debated public policy issues over the past few decades because they are believed to 
create some perverse incentives, resulting in unintended outcomes. For instance, there is 
by now extensive literature on the disincentives to work created by the benefit system; 
the programmes’ nature and structure, generosity of benefits, certain eligibility 
requirements and payments in both cash and in kind appear to reduce incentives to 
work4.  
 
Another important area where welfare and tax policies have secondary consequences is 
in regards to agents’ decisions on family formation, which include the following: 5 
                                                 
1 See Prebble and Rebstock, 1992, p. 2. 
2 See Ibid, p. 2. 
3 See Ibid, p. 2-10. 
4 See Blackburn, 2000, p. 117; Moffitt, 1992, p. 2; Hoynes, 1996, p. 1-2 
5 See The New Zealand Family Commission, 2006, p. 25 
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- Relationship formation decisions, which include when couples physically start 
living together as well as whether or not to get married or cohabit. 
- Family size decisions, which include both the timing decision as well as the 
decision on the optimum number of children. 
- Dissolution decision, which includes when a relationship, especially those 
involving children, is dissolved. 
- Reconstitution decision, which includes the forming of new relationships, in 
which at least one partner has previously had a cohabiting relationship or has a 
child from the previous relationship (cohabiting is not required in this case). 
- Living arrangement decision, which includes how a couple arranges the how 
and who their children will be living with.  
 
The intuition behind why the welfare and tax policies could impact family and 
relationship formation of individuals is because most of the welfare and tax policies 
comprise unequal treatments of married/cohabitating/de facto couples and sole and two-
parent families through their structures and eligibility requirements6. Thus, the 
incentives to choose one family structure, one living arrangement and one childbearing 
decision over others arise.7 According to Cantillon (1994): 
 
“….Because choices regarding marriage, cohabitation, divorce and 
remarriage are no longer ruled by the values of the past, it is 
generally accepted that some (potential) beneficiaries may use the 
opportunities offered by complex social security provisions, 
sometimes even adjusting their demographic behaviour to the 
institutional environment. Social security is not neutral towards the 
family. Nor can it be, even if based on the strategy of basic income. 
This leads to a self-reinforcing mechanism whereby social protection 
itself could act as a factor affecting socio-demographic 
behaviour….” (Cited in Whiteford, 1997, p.2). 
 
In this thesis, I examine the impact of the welfare and tax systems on the family and 
relationship formation and fertility decisions in New Zealand. This chosen narrow scope 
                                                 
6 See The New Zealand Family Commission, 2006 p. 28 
7 See Hoynes, 1996, p. 18 
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enables an in-depth analysis of this topic.  I also hope that my study will create a 
significant incentive for other people to more broadly examine this research question.  
 
1.2 Motivations behind my thesis
 
There have been significant changes in household structure in most OECD countries 
over the past few decades. The traditional two-parent household is losing prominence 
and single-headed households are becoming more common.  Increases in the numbers 
of such non-traditional family units, as well as changes in other demographic factors 
such as marital rates, divorce and fertility patterns, have been documented for many 
OECD countries in the last few decades, most notably the United States8.  
 
This trend is evident in New Zealand as well for the past 25 years9. For instance, in 
1981 only 1 in 6 families was a single parent family with dependent children. However, 
a single parent family had become more common with a frequency of 1 in 4 families by 
1991. Moreover, the growth in single parent families was the fastest among those 
population groups who had never been formally married10. Consequently, now New 
Zealand has the highest proportion of single parents in the OECD. Another interesting 
trend which has been captured in the demographical change context in New Zealand is 
that the employment rates among married and sole mothers show quite a large 
discrepancy. This could have been a result of the operation of Domestic Purposes 
Benefits (DPB)11, as well as cultural norms. However, this knowledge helps show that 
there are possible incentive effects from the DPB. Note that the demographic change 
with regards to marital and childbearing behaviours in New Zealand for the last few 
decades will be discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
 
Also in my thesis, legal marriage and cohabitation are treated as equivalent. This is due 
to the equal treatment and recognition of both legal marriage and cohabitation by New 
Zealand law. Consequently, when I examine the effect of benefit and tax changes on 
                                                 
8 See Moffit, 1992, p. 1-2, Mauldon, p. 1; Hoynes, 1996, p. 12.; Nolan, 2005, p. 158-159; Hakovirta, 
2001, p. 3 
9 See the Ministry of Social and Development, 2005, p. 7 
[http://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/documents/2005/sr05-people.pdf]; Nolan and Fairbrother, 2005, p. 
1; Whiteford, 1997, p.1 
10 See St. John, 1994, p. 2 
11 DPB will be discussed in more detail in chapter five. Basically, DPB is a New Zealand welfare benefit 
programme that has been operated for decades in order to help reduce financial burden of single parent 
families. 
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family formation, I will examine whether the cost and benefit (utility) of 
marriage/cohabitation is altered relative to living separately as single parents, for 
instance12. 
 
In most developed countries, there is some evidence that welfare and tax policies might 
have caused the increase in the incidence of one-parent families, especially female-
headed households, in which women are not married to or cohabiting with their 
partners13. However, the magnitude of the welfare and tax effect is not large. Because of 
the incentives caused by different assessment units in New Zealand’s tax and benefit 
system, (which will be elaborated in more detail in later chapters14) two potential 
partners might be more likely to maximise their income if they choose to live in a non-
traditional one-parent household, especially among low-income earners.  
The first factor behind my motivation in this area of research is the claim that although 
welfare and tax policies may accomplish the goals they are intentionally designed for, 
which are poverty reduction and improvement in living standard among the recipients, 
they may have other outcomes that are unintentional and socially undesirable, especially 
outcomes regarding the family formation15. Consequently, this has urged me to examine 
whether this claim has any basis.  
 
Secondly, there has not yet been a comprehensive study conducted in New Zealand to 
examine this question16. In contrast, there has been significant research in this area in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, as well as Australia. However, the findings of 
this overseas literature are mixed both in terms of the existence and the magnitude of 
the impacts of the welfare benefits and tax systems on family formation issues. These 
differences in findings may be a consequence of different methodology, data sets and 
approaches employed by the researchers. According to Cantillon (1994):  
 
                                                 
12 A couple may be living in separate households while maintaining their existing relationship, however, 
by living in separate households the existence of their relationship cannot be proven. Consequently, 
whether or not the couple is having a relationship when living apart is outside the scope of my thesis. (See 
The New Zealand Family Commission, 2006, p. 28 
13 See Gauthier, 2001, p. 1; Blackburn, 2000, p. 116; Schultz, 1994, p. 638;  Hoynes, 1995, p. 1-2; Nolan, 
2005, p. 5-6 
14 The theoretical framework will be illustrated in more detail in the chapter two. 
15 Recall that the decision regarding family formation can be divided into 3 sub decisions, which are the 
decisions on partnership formation, dissolution and reconstitution decisions (page 3). 
16 See The Family Commission, op. Cit., p. 8. 
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“…The empirical data are unsurprisingly equivocal when 
it comes to the existence, scope, and nature of 
behavioural effects. Decisions about the organisation of 
family life are influenced by a multiplicity of social, 
cultural, and psychological factors. Financial incentives 
(including social protection) are only one influence. An 
empirical separation of the direct influence of social 
security on behaviour is difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, 
the question of the influence of social security benefits on 
marriage, divorce or remarriage is of great political 
significance.” (Cited in Whiteford, 1997, p. 2). 
 
In addition, both the existence and the magnitude of the impacts are likely to vary based 
on the groups of populations17. This suggests that an examination of this issue is of 
crucial importance for New Zealand, which has a comprehensive benefits system in 
place. This study is a response to the increasing recognition of the intrinsic importance 
of family related issues to the welfare system’s design and objectives. 
 
Thirdly, as mentioned above, New Zealand has also been experiencing significant 
changes in household structure over the past few decades, which include the noteworthy 
increases in the numbers of sole parent families.  The majority of these sole parent 
families are mother only18,19. In contrast, the proportions of couples with children have 
been gradually declining since 1986. Besides, these demographic changes have been 
occurring even as a significant number of welfare and tax reforms have been introduced 
since the 1980s. As a result, the significant time frames of each reform of the welfare 
and tax policies since 1986 and the gradual changes in the numbers and patterns of 
single parent families have given rise to an opportunity to analyse whether these two 
trends might be related. Additionally, since the growth in the female single parent 
families has been a lot more drastic than the male single parent families in New 
Zealand, my thesis will focus on female single parent families only. There are a 
number of reasons for focusing on female single parent families.  
 
                                                 
17 See Whiteford, 1997. p. 2 
18 Note that the proportion single has been significantly increasing, compared to the growth of male single 
parent families. 
19 See Nolan, 2005, p. 158. 
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Firstly, there is some evidence supporting the claim that female-headed families tend to 
experience less desirable levels of both economic and social well-being than the 
traditional two-parent families with males being the heads of the families20,21. 
Moreover, single parent families are undoubtedly among the most disadvantaged 
population groups in most societies For instance, in New Zealand, female single persons 
and single parent families have relatively lower living standards than the male ones22.  
 
Another reason why single mother families should be given more attention, apart from 
the high possibility of having lower living standards, is that well-documented evidence 
from most developed countries suggests that single mothers who are suffering from 
poverty tend to experience longer poverty spells and represent quite a disproportional 
share of those who are persistently poor23. This poverty among single mother families 
and their persistent longer spells of poverty has led to the term “feminisation of 
poverty”24. Additionally, there is evidence that this phenomenon is transmitted through 
generations; children who are born in the aforementioned single female headed families 
have a higher tendency to have lower academic achievement, experience a variety of 
difficulties at school, be early school leavers, have children out-of-wedlock and are 
more likely to become single heads of household like their mothers25.  
 
Note that, ethnicity could also play a great role in the incentives; however, it probably 
affects the level of sole parenting, rather than changes in the level. 
 
Another important motivation for my focus on this research question is if it is true that 
the structure and nature of the welfare and income tax policies create incentives among 
low income population groups to prefer one type of family and relationship formation 
over others due to the comparative gains through these policies, could this imply that 
this population group has a higher tendency to become more dependent on the welfare 
benefits. Consequently, they may be more inclined to stay on the benefits for longer 
                                                 
20 See Hoynes, 1995, p. 1; Moffitt, 1992, p. 2; Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 1999, p. 2, Hoynes, 1996, p. 
13; The Royal Security in New Zealand, 1972, chapter 22 (also see the original papers that directly do the 
research on the poverty among single mother families Haveman and Wolfe, 1994; McLanahan and 
Sadefur, 1994) 
21 see Dickert-Conlin and Houser, op. cit., p. 2; Horvath and Peters, 1999, p. 1; Krishnan et al, 2002, p.46, 
51; Hakovirta, 2001, p. 5 
22 See Krishnan, op. cit., p. 46-47 
23 See Hoynes, op. cit., p. 1; Zhan and Pandey, 2004, p. 662  (also see the original research papers Bane 
and Ellwood, 1986 and Duncan 1984) 
24 See Moffitt, 1992, p. 2; Pong, 1996, p. 231 
25 See Hoynes, op. cit., p. 1.; Pong, op. cit., p. 231-232;  
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periods of time than other population groups, and may become caught up in a vicious 
cycle of poverty and low living standards26. This is a cause for genuine concern because 
the recipients of income-tested benefits have shown to have significantly lower living 
standards compared to market income earners27. Thus, it is in my interest to examine 
whether or not New Zealand’s welfare and tax systems could have been one of the 
reasons why low income single mothers have chosen to stay on the benefits, which in 
turn has caused them to have comparatively lower living standards than other groups in 
the population. Graph 1.1 illustrates the living standards distribution by income source 
in the year 2000. From graph 1.1, it can be seen that the living standards of benefit 
recipients overall are significantly lower than those of market income earners. 57 
percent of benefit recipients are in the lower living standard levels (level 1 to 3) as 
compared to only 14 percent of market income earners. 
  
Graph 1.2 represents the comparison of living standards of the economic family unit 
with dependent children only, given the different income sources. Even though graph 
1.2 represents a smaller sample than graph 1.1, a similar trend of living standards is still 
evident; those families with dependent children whose main income source is the 
welfare benefit payments have significantly lower living standards as compared to those 
families with children whose major source of income is market income. 63 percent of 
families with dependent children, whose major income source is benefits payments, are 
in the lower living standards (level 1 to 3) as compared to only 16 percent of those 
families with dependent children, whose major source of income is market income28.  
 
My thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter Two: Theoretical framework 
Chapter Three: A literature review on this area of research conducted overseas. 
Chapter Four: Background of the demographic changes in New Zealand during the last 
few decades. 
Chapter Five: A background of New Zealand’s tax and welfare system and how they 
have evolved since 1986 including in-depth discussions of each welfare programme 
included in the thesis. 
                                                 
26 Also those people who have originally been on the benefit programmes tend to be likely to be low 
skilled and thus would only receive little wages. Therefore, these people are discouraged to be looking for 
work and thus would prefer to be on the  benefits instead (Birch, 1996, p. 31) 
27 See Krishnan et al, 2002, p. 61; Birch, op. cit., p. 32 
28 See Krishnan et al, op. cit, p. 111; Nolan, 2005, p. 172 
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Chapter Six: Hypotheses- discussions of how the welfare and tax systems could impact 
low-income women’s decision regarding family and relationship formation as well as 
childbearing. 
Chapter Seven: Testing the hypotheses- Examples of how the welfare and tax systems 
could impact a hypothetical single mother’s income and thus her incentives to be a 
single mother and have children.  
Chapter Eight: Empirical analysis, findings and discussions. 
Chapter Nine: Conclusions 
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Graph 1.1: Living standards distribution of total population by income source 
2000.
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Derived from Krishnan, 2002, p. 61. 
 
Note: VR- Very Restricted, R- Restricted, SR- Somewhat Restricted, FC- Fairly 
comfortable, C- Comfortable, G- Good and V- Very Good. For more explanation of 
each abbreviation of the living standard levels please refer to an appendix B. 
 
Graph 1.2: Living standards of families with children by income source 2000.
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Derived from Krishnan, 2002, p. 111. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Theoretical Framework
Although the main analysis of the issue in this study is based on the economic 
perspective, other major proximate influences such as cultural, sociological and 
psychological factors, which are shown in chart 2.1, should also be taken into account. 
However, since this study’s main focus is on financial incentives that could have been 
caused by the tax and welfare systems, thus, the following sections discuss the financial 
incentives and how they impact the family and relationship formations and fertility 
decisions of women.  
 
Additionally, as aforementioned in chapter one, this study focuses on female single 
parent families, which could be either unmarried mothers or mothers who are already in 
a relationship and have to make a different, but related, decision concerning whether or 
not to leave the relationship, whereas, this study’s main population group of analysis is 
unmarried single mothers. 
2.1.1 Decisions regarding family and relationship formations: the economics theory 
of marriage
The theoretical framework applied in this thesis is the one employed in most of the 
research papers in this area, which is the theory of marriage pioneered by Becker in 
1973 and 19741. The framework is based on the hypothesis of, besides other 
determinants, whether or not the welfare and tax policies influence family formation 
decisions, which include marital status, living arrangements, and childbearing decisions 
of unmarried mothers2.  According to the theory, unmarried mothers will take into 
account all the possible factors, including government benefits and taxes that could 
                                                 
1 See Hoynes, 1995, p. 8 
2 Unmarried mothers can be never married, separated or divorced. 
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affect their utilities when they are outside and inside the union of 
marriage/cohabitation3.  
 
Theoretically, unmarried women with dependent children will take into account the 
following factors that directly impact their utilities when considering whether or not 
they are better off being in the marriage. These factors are women’s wages, their 
potential partner’s wages (note that both the women’s and their partner’s wages are the 
earnings shared within the union if the marriage is formed)4, earnings outside the union; 
such as benefit payments including welfare transfers and tax credit/negative tax 
payments depending on whether or not any particular women are eligible, and other 
observable and unobservable characteristics of these women5. The utility function can 
be derived as follows; 
 
U (FH, WF, WM, B,X)6                                                   (1) 
Here, U represents maximum utility received between choosing either marriage or 
female headship (they can still have on-going relationships with their partner, however, 
they will not be behaving in such a way that will represent them as married couples – 
for instance, they may have separate living arrangements.)  
 
 FH is a female headship variable, which is equal to one if the women with 
children choose to become heads of their families and choose not to marry or 
forsake marriage. 
 Wf is the wages of the woman, net of taxes 
 Wm is the potential wages of woman’s partner, net of taxes 
 B is the welfare benefits and tax credit returns (negative tax) 
 X is the woman’s characteristics 
 
It is likely that women with children will choose female headship over marriage if FH* 
is greater than zero, given that FH* represents the difference in the maximum utility 
received between female headship and being married. This can be algebraically written 
as; 
                                                 
3 See Becker, 1973 
4 Theoretically, it is assumed that the earnings between wives and husbands will be shared among them 
within the same households. 
5 See Becker, op. cit.; Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 1999, p. 3-4; Moffitt, 1992, p. 29. 
6 See Becker, op. cit; Hoynes, 1995, p. 9 
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                        FH* !U1 "U 2                       (2) 
 
 
Given the conditions that FH = { 
                             
       and      U1 = U(1,W f ,0,B, X)  
      U2 = U(0,W f ,M m,I, X)  
         I = [0,B] 
 
I is the amount of benefit payments women would receive when she is partnered, which 
vary from 0 to the maximum amount of B. The amount of the benefit payments she 
receives depend on both how much labour earning her partner earns and how much 
labour earning she earns if she works7.  
 
 
In order to examine how welfare and tax systems could impact each individual’s 
decision to form a union, we can examine how these two systems impact each factor in 
the utility function. As previously stated, marriage can result in quite significant 
changes in the disposable income unmarried women may receive when compared to 
their earnings prior to the marriage as a result of the combined impact of the welfare and 
income tax systems. Some of these women might suffer significant losses of the 
disposable income if they choose to get married to their partners, especially if their 
partner earns sufficient labour income that can make their new household’s income 
higher beyond the exemption income levels. The loss in the income as a result of 
marriage is referred to as a marriage penalty8. The loss can occur through (i) some of 
                                                 
7 Note that in order to analyse the probability that each woman will choose to become a single mother 
over marriage, the woman’s wage and her partner’s wage need to be observed
7
. However, the partner’s 
wage can only be observed if the woman is married and the partner is working. Moreover, her own wage 
can only be observed only if she is working. Consequently, if a woman is not in a marriage or her spouse 
is not working at the time of the observation, her spouse’s wages will not be observed. Moreover, if the 
woman is not working, we will not be able to observe her wage either. Thus, this gives rise to a
counterfactual problem.  
 
8 The gain in the income after marriage is thus referred to as marriage subsidy. 
1 if FH
*
> 0 
0 otherwise  
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the original benefits these women have already been receiving are abated against the 
new household income (their partner’ labour income) and (ii) their partner’s labour 
market earnings are taxed away. This combined effect of both the welfare and tax 
systems could increase an incentive of some women with children to choose female 
headship over marriage, especially when a ratio of their income prior to marriage to 
income after marriage significantly declines9,10.  Examples of hypothetical single 
mothers in chapter seven will provide a clearer application of this theory. 
 
Graphically, the pathways of how the welfare benefit and tax systems could impact on 
family formation decisions can be basically illustrated in the model in chart 2.1, adopted 
from Fein et al 200211. Theoretically, there are a number of different channels through 
which the welfare and tax policies could impact decisions regarding relationship and 
family formations. Although the main analysis of the issue is based on the economic 
perspective, other proximate influences such as cultural, sociological and psychological 
factors should also be taken into account12. As it can be seen from chart 2.1, the impact 
of the welfare and tax systems on the family related decisions can either be direct (path 
3), or indirect, which is mediated by employment (path 1) or family income (path 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.2: Decisions regarding childbearing: Economic Model of Fertility
Becker’s (1973) economic theory of family13, which was previously elaborated, set the 
foundations for another well-known theory employed in much of the research on the 
relationship between government policy and fertility. Theoretically, Becker states that 
the demand for children can be algebraically explained as a function of each 
individual’s preference at a given level of income, and the costs (both monetary and 
                                                 
9 See Becker, 1973; Hoynes, 1995, p. 8-9; Moffitt, 1992, p. 29 
10 However, this marriage’s model has quite a number of assumptions that need to be held in order to 
make it valid. One of the assumptions is that each woman is rational and aware of her choices of the 
headship status. Moreover, she is assumed to have perfect information of the determinants of her own 
utility. However, some economists argue that these assumptions may be implausible because not every 
woman would have perfect information of the choices and determinants of their utilities.  
11 See The New Zealand Family Commission, 2006, p. 23 
12 See Ibid, p. 23 
13 See Ibid, p. 46 
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non-monetary) incurred from having children14. Consequently, the utilities of parents 
are directly dependent on both the quantity and quality of children15. The quality of 
children refers to their well being both physically and mentally, including such matters 
as good education and healthcare16. Theoretically, women will make a decision of 
whether or not their child should be conceived by examining both the costs and the 
benefits of having a child. Hence, if the benefits of bearing a child outweigh the costs, 
women will be more likely to have a child17. 
 
As previously stated, the demand for having children is a function of the levels of 
income and the costs of bearing children; thus, changes in both these factors will 
directly impact on the decision regarding fertility. However, changes in levels of income 
have an ambiguous impact on the number of children. Increasing income may ease the 
financial difficulty and thus having more children becomes more affordable and viable. 
On the other hand, increasing income may result in parents’ desire to substitute quality 
for quantity. This hypothesis implies that instead of having more children as a result of 
increasing income, parents may want to spend this marginal income on their existing 
child through more expensive education and better lifestyle. Thus, in this case, 
increasing income may lead to falling fertility18. 
 
Additionally, the cost factor of the demand for children also plays a great role in the 
fertility decision of parents. There are various factors, which could either directly or 
indirectly impact the costs of bearing a child. The costs of having a child can be either 
direct monetary costs, which involve the tangible costs of raising a child, such as 
childcare expenses and healthcare expenses. Non-monetary costs can be human capital 
costs of the mothers who have to forgo training and working experience in the labour 
force while raising their child. Moreover, the non-monetary costs can also occur in the 
form of opportunity cost, which refers to the labour earnings foregone as a result of not 
                                                 
14 See The New Zealand Family Commission, 2006,  p. 46, Becker and Barro, 1988, p. 1 
15 See The New Zealand Family Commission, op. cit., 46, Becker and Barro, op. cit, p. 3, Peter, Plotnick 
and Jeong, 2001, p. 4 
16 See The New Zealand Family Commission, op. cit., p. 46 
17 The New Zealand Family Commission, op. Cit., 46, Becker and Barro, op. cit., p. 3, Peter, Plotnick and 
Jeong, op. cit., p. 4 
 
18 See The New Zealand Family Commission, op. cit., p. 46 
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being in a labour force or a reduction of work hours due to the care of a child19. As 
stated in Grant et al (2004): 
 
“Hence, as labour market opportunities expand for 
women during the process of economic development, 
the cost of raising children increases” (cited in The 
New Zealand Family Commission, 2006, p. 46). 
 
Theoretically, any government policies that could have either direct or indirect impact 
on both the levels of income and the costs of bearing children, would have an impact on 
the fertility decision of these parents. Hence, any welfare and tax programmes that 
result in a direct or indirect reduction in the costs of having children are assumed to 
have a positive impact on fertility. For example, the DPBs provide financial assistance 
to single parent families through direct payment from the government to the recipients’ 
bank account; this indirectly reduces the costs of having children. Moreover, the 
Accommodation Supplement provided to low-income families also indirectly reduces 
the cost of having children in such a way that the housing expenses are partially 
subsidised. Thus, there is extra income, which can be spent on children. In contrast, any 
policies that result in a direct or indirect increase in the costs of having children would 
have a reverse effect on the fertility decision20. Nevertheless, it is unpredictable whether 
welfare and tax policies, which result in an increase in income, would lead to the 
parents’ desire to have more children. It is, whether or not the quantity effect outweighs 
the quality effect.  
 
As common as any other insurance scheme, despite the unpredictable outcome of how 
an increase in income may impact the fertility decision, welfare and tax policies acting 
as an insurance against the unfortunate outcome of single parenthood are likely to result 
in the moral hazard problem. This terminology of moral hazard implies that if women 
acknowledge that having more children will instantly make them eligible for a marginal 
increase in earnings from the government, they may deliberately bear more children. It 
has been a widely accepted assumption that the marginal cost of having an extra child is 
                                                 
19 See The New Zealand Family Commission,  2006,  p. 46,; Peter, Plotnick and Jeong, 2001, p. 4 
 
20 See Peter, Plotnick and Jeong, op. cit., p. 4; The New Zealand Family Commission, op. cit., p. 46 
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less than the financial cost of having the first child born to the household due to the 
economies of scale21. As a result, the women’s total earning may be maximised. Chart 
2.2 illustrates how the welfare and tax policies could have an impact on the fertility 
decision. 
 
From chart 2.2, it can be seen that there are several paths through which the 
government’s welfare and tax policies could impact the decision regarding fertility and 
family size. These policies can have either a direct or indirect impact on the decision 
through various proximate determinants, including changes in the costs of having 
children, broader economic factors, individual lifestyle factors, and societal norms. 
Moreover, the different units of assessment (joint or individual) of the tax system can 
influence the decision of whether or not to have children through a proximate 
determinant of individual lifestyle. Basically, different units of tax assessment have a 
direct impact on how the household’s income will be shared among spouses. Hence, this 
can have an impact on whether or not a relationship should be formed. From chart 2.2, 
certain changes in each proximate determinant such as increasing in the costs of 
children, uncertainty about the future increases or less generous of the childcare, these 
may lead to lower fertility. On the other hand, if these changes occur in an opposite 
direction, in essence the costs of having children decrease, the future becomes more 
certain or increases in the childcare generosity, they may possibly lead to increasing 
fertility. 
 
 
2.2: Why do we need to consider both the welfare and tax policies when examining 
the family formation decisions?
There are a number of reasons why both welfare and tax policies need or should be 
examined simultaneously when considering whether or not these policies impact on 
family formation decisions of the affected groups of populations and also the magnitude 
of the impacts. Firstly, both welfare and some of tax policies were originally designed 
to provide financial assistance to the similar target groups, which are low-income 
families with dependent children. In essence, they provide the benefit or tax credit 
payments to these lower income families with children from the tax payments received 
                                                 
21 See Nolan, 2005, p. 48 
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from higher income families and individuals. Consequently, this similarity of target 
groups has provided the linkage between these two policies. Secondly and as previously 
mentioned, some welfare programmes are believed to have been more favourable 
toward one-parent families than two-parent families, through eligibility requirements 
and the programme’s structure. Thus, the welfare policy is believed to have created 
some incentives for female headship over marriage during the past few decades. 
 
Thirdly, New Zealand’s welfare and tax systems have completely different units of 
assessment. For the welfare benefit system, or the so-called “Social Assistance” 
system22, the unit of assessment is based on the entire household as a whole23. 
Consequently, the household’s income, not the income of each individual member of 
the household, is to be considered when regarding whether or not the household is 
eligible for the benefit. If so, how much of the benefit payments will the household be 
entitled to.  However, for the income tax system, the unit of assessment is purely based 
on individuals24. Thus, regardless of the household’s income, each member of the 
household is legally bound to pay the income tax if they are in the labour force and 
receiving labour income.  Moreover, due to the changes in household structure, 
employment outcomes, as well as the introduction of the taxation of main welfare 
benefits over the past few decades, have implied that larger proportions of the New 
Zealand population can now be affected by both the welfare and tax systems 
simultaneously25. Consequently, due to these differences in the units of assessment and 
the increasing integration between the tax and welfare systems in New Zealand, it is 
inevitable for both the welfare and income tax policies to be taken into account when 
analysing how the government policies could impact relationship and family formation.  
 
Clearly, as women are different in their characteristics and therefore in their 
entitlements to the financial assistance from the welfare benefit system, the decision to 
get married with their partners will vary depending on each woman and her 
circumstances such as hours of work, numbers and ages of children, wage rates 
received, marital status, accommodation needs as well as receipt of other assistance. 
Therefore, EMTRs (effective marginal tax rates) faced by different low-income women 
                                                 
22 See Nolan, 2003, p. 3 
23 See Nolan, 2005. 
24 See The New Zealand Families Commission, 2006, p. 17. 
25 See Nolan, 2003, p. 8 
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will be different26. Thus, given all these reasons above, the impact of government 
policies on the family and relationship formation decisions27 cannot, and should not be 
examined separately because these policies, especially the welfare and tax policies, 
could either mitigate or exacerbate each other’s effect on people’s incentives. As a 
result, it is important for economists to realise this and take both the welfare and tax 
credit policies into account when examining the determinants of family formation 
decision, as we need to emphasise the combined impact of these two policies. Paying 
attention only to one or the other separately could result in a misleading conclusion by 
either overstating or understating the true impact of the government policies on the 
family and relationship formation issues28. 
 
2.3: The target population of this study  
The target population group in this thesis research is single parent family, especially 
those with low income. As previously shown that the majority of the single parent 
family population is mother only families, and the rate of changes in the mother only 
families have been significantly more dramatic than father only families29, thus, the 
main focus will be on single mother rather than single father families. Moreover, this 
target group will be the most directly impacted by the welfare and tax policies because 
they are the populations that the policies are originally intended to provide assistance to. 
They also compose the highest proportion towards the overall welfare recipient 
populations30. Moreover, it was previously stated that both mothers and children of the 
female-headed families are believed to have comparatively worse social and economic 
performances than the traditional two-parent families. Thus, if this thesis can provide 
more evidence whether the welfare and tax credit policies have been a partial 
contributor to the problem, it will provide more guidance on how the policies could be 
improved. Therefore, these increases in the numbers of single mothers over the past few 
decades have triggered an alarm to investigate whether or not the welfare and tax 
policies are appropriately blamed as being responsible. 
                                                 
26 See Nolan, 2005, p. 140 
27 Recall that the decision regarding family formation can be divided into 3 sub decisions, which are the 
decisions on partnership formation, dissolution and reconstitution decisions. 
 
28 See Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 1998, p. 175 
 
30 see Hoynes, 1996, p. 2-5; Rozzelle, 2003, p. 3; Scott, 1993, p. 172 
Sorraya Yosyingyong                                                                                                    19
                        
  
Chart 2.1: Pathways of how the welfare and tax systems could impact family 
formation decisions
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Whiteford, 1997. 
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Chart 2.2: Model of reproductive decisions: proximate determinants and policy 
measures
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Derived from Sleebos, 2003, cited in The New Zealand Family Commission, 2006, p. 4. 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review of how the welfare benefit and tax policies 
could impact on relationship and family formation decisions of single mothers with 
no/low income and relatively uneducated.
The review is divided into three main sections (i) literature of impact of welfare and tax 
systems on marriage/union formation and child bearing decisions in New Zealand, (ii) 
literature of impact of welfare and tax systems on marriage/union formation and found 
overseas and (iii) literature of impact of welfare and tax systems on childbearing 
decisions found overseas. 
 
3.1 Impact of welfare and tax systems on marriage/relationship formation and 
childbearing decision in New Zealand
While there is quite extensive research and studies in this area overseas, there has been 
very little research conducted in New Zealand. There have only been a few studies 
conducted on the Domestic Purpose Benefit and its impact on sole parenthood. One of 
most recent studies on the subject is by Goodger (1998). However, while the details of 
the changes in the incidence of sole parenthood, benefits changes and their use as a tool 
to assist sole parents to gain employment are well documented, the casual links between 
the DPB and sole parenthood and child birth outside marriages are not established. She 
suggests that it is considerably complicated to find the actual welfare effect since the 
benefit changes were frequently accompanied by other factors including legislative 
changes, social, economic and technological changes. Prior to her study, the Department 
of Social Welfare endeavoured to conduct a study on the DPB in 1988. They reported 
that the DPB may increase women’s incentive to not sustain a union with their partner, 
to have and keep their babies especially for younger women, and to not re-establish old 
relationships or to form new ones. Nevertheless, there was no comprehensive study of 
the effects of the DPB on relationship formation available at the time of this report. A 
qualitative study of the DPB’s effects on child rearing behaviours conducted by Wylie 
(1980) interviewed sole parents and reported that while these sole parents were on the 
DPB, they did not have any intentions to become pregnant, and if they did, they were 
already in a stable relationship with their partner. Consequently, due to insufficient 
evidence the Department of Social Welfare suggested in the report that the welfare 
effect could not be discounted simply because there was no rigorous evidence at the 
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time. They noted that given the demographic trends regarding family and relationship 
formations, welfare benefits might have considerable influences on partnership 
formation but not on child rearing decisions. However, without further investigation, no 
judgement could not be made.  
 
However, there are also other two papers by Maloney (1999), (2000) which are worth 
mentioning. These papers relate to some of the welfare reforms in early 1990s that are 
the subject of this study. Even though these two papers main focus is on the welfare 
effect on labour supply and unemployment and not on the effect on the family and 
fertility decisions, they are still worth reading in order to get a better understanding of 
the welfare reforms and how the reforms could impact behavioural changes. Maloney 
(1999) states that the structure of the benefit system and the nature of welfare reforms in 
early 1990s do provide a unique opportunity to examine the labour supply behavioural 
responses. He conducts this study followed the theory that due to the lower benefits and 
tighten eligibility rules, these would result in higher labour supply of potential and 
existing beneficiaries. He states that this area of study conducted overseas normally 
encounters two major problems: (1) the complexity of those countries’ welfare systems 
results in a difficulty in condensing the features of these benefit programmes into a 
controllable set of regressors that explain the complex work disincentives and (2) the 
requirement of some exogenous variation in the explanatory variables in the regression, 
which sometimes can be a difficult task. But because (1) New Zealand’s welfare system 
is relatively easy to identify the elements of the programmes that could affect labour 
supply and (2) the reductions in the nominal benefit rates were not uniform across 
demographic groups resulted in a variation in both the magnitude and timing of the 
benefit changes and this variation is close enough to be the exogenous variation needed 
in the regression study needed to isolate associated labour supply responses; therefore, 
the author could reduce the seriousness of the aforementioned problems.  The author 
employs the data from Household Labour Force Participation Survey consisting of non-
disabled individuals aged between 16 and 64 years. The author then calculated the un-
uniform reductions in the benefit rates in order to investigate how the changes in the 
benefits impacted those different affected groups of people. He uses the labour force 
participation rate as a determinant of labour supply. The time series of the trend in the 
labour force participation rate and the changes in the mean real maximum benefit rates 
do not show the evidence that the benefit cut positively influenced labour supply. 
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However, due to the recession during the reforms, this could have understated the 
reforms effect on the labour supply. Hence, the author runs a regression analysis 
controlling for other factors such as economic condition and therefore isolate the effect 
of this specific welfare reforms on labour supply could be isolated from those factors. 
The author writes the labour supply (measured by labour force participation rate, 
weekly hours of labour supplied and proportion of individuals in a cell who were either 
working or studying when they were out of the labour force) as a function of quarterly 
dummies, demographic characteristics such as age and education, natural logarithm of 
weekly benefit and changes in eligible ages of three main welfare programs. The results 
show benefit cuts would increase labour force participation as well as weekly hours 
supplied. 
 
Moloney (2000) re-examines the welfare effect on labour supply in New Zealand labour 
market using a regression analysis to isolate the welfare effect resulting from the 
welfare reform in 1990s. However, this paper pays more attention to the unemployment 
rate. The author attempts to answer the question of whether or not the generosity in the 
welfare system could lead to the increases in the unemployment and whether or not the 
benefit cut in 1991 could lead to lower unemployment rate. He uses the same logic, 
methodology and data source as his 1999’s paper in essence he takes advantage of the 
fact that the structure of New Zealand’s welfare system is not very complicated which 
helps reduce the problem of measurement errors and the reforms were not uniform 
across demographic groups. The author creates dummy variables for each quarter over 
the sample period to hold constant time specific, group-invariant factors in his 
regression analysis. The author states that this regression specification is only feasible in 
panel nature of New Zealand’s data.  These help reduce the problems of omitted-
variable bias in essence it helps reduce the possibility that the benefits variables might 
proxy for other factors such as economic condition.  Three measures of “economic 
inactivity” that could be affected by the reforms the author is interested in finding are 
the unemployment rate, the joblessness and non-participation rate. Like his paper in 
1999, the time series of these three economic inactivity and changes in the benefit 
system do not show irrefutable evidence that the reforms reduced economic inactivity. 
Hence, the regression analysis is needed. The author finds no evidence that the reforms 
reduced unemployment rate but the reforms actually increased the unemployment rate 
by 0.25 percent. He also finds that the reforms decreased other two aspects of economic 
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inactivity, which are joblessness rate and non-participation rate by one-tenth of a 
percentage point and 3.2 percentage points respectively. 
 
3.2: Impact of welfare and tax systems on marriage and relationship formation 
decision found overseas.
There has been a significant amount of research on the disincentive effect of welfare 
benefits on labour force participation31. In contrast, the research on the impact of the 
welfare and tax credit policies on family formation and childbearing issues are more of 
a new breed, and thus, there has been a smaller volume of literature on the effect of the 
welfare and tax credit policies on the family formation.  
 
Although there has been quite a large body of research that has examined the “welfare 
effect” hypothesis of whether or not welfare and transfer policies have any impact on 
family formation and family structure for the past couple of decades, there is still no 
consensus on the issue32. Thus, the general finding is that welfare and transfer policies 
have some impact on the family formation and fertility issues; however, the directions 
and magnitudes of the impact are relatively varied33.  
 
Prior to the 1970s the results were confusingly mixed and thus they could not yield a 
consensus of both the direction and magnitude of the impact of the welfare and transfer 
policies on family formation34. However, many studies conducted during the 1980s tend 
to provide much less confusing and much more consistent evidence that the welfare and 
transfer policies are believed to have a small but positive and significant effect on 
female headship decision among low income women with children35. This is because 
data sets have gotten better over time in terms of the richness of information collected 
and also, there has been an improvement in the econometric methodology and 
techniques used in the analysis. This literature review will only examine those studies 
from the 1980s onward. 
                                                 
31 See Hoynes, 1996, p. 21-25, Moffit, 1992, p. 2 
32 See Hoynes, 1995, p. 6; Hoynes, 1999, p. 11; Murray, 1993, p. s225; Moehling, 2005, p. 1. 
33 See Moffitt, op. cit. 
34 See Ibid, p. 30-31 
35 See Moffitt,  op. cit. p. 27-31 and Hoynes, 1996, p. 11 
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Also, some studies suggest that the more variables such as ethnicity, employment 
opportunities, race and age are controlled for in the study, the more the estimated 
welfare effect becomes weaker, and in some cases the effect is insignificant36. There are 
a number of studies that found some welfare effect on the marital decision of women. 
Moffitt (1944) illustrates the importance of the inclusion of area/geographic effects in 
the estimation of welfare effects on female headship decision in America. In essence 
when the area/geographic effects are included, the signs of benefit coefficients found in 
cross-sections are reversed, or the significance of the coefficients is greatly reduced. 
The author introduces the state-specific (area) effect, which in this case is the presence 
of the AFDC-UP which is not available in every state as well as five labour market 
factors including unemployment rates, percents of employment in manufacturing, 
wholesale and retail trade, services and government, into similar reduced-form 
equations found in other studies in this area and conducts a regression analysis. These 
reduced-form equations control four main economic and demographic factors impacting 
the welfare effect including age, wage, opportunity and so forth. The author uses data 
from March Current Population Survey from the year 1968 to 1989 because it is the 
only data set that provides sufficient sample size with state-specific effects. He narrows 
down the target population to women who are either a house or subfamily head with 
children aged below 18 years old, whose spouse is absent. The main sample includes 
black and white women aged between 20-44 years old with less than 12 years of 
education so that the analysis can focus on those who are the most likely to have the 
higher AFDC participation rates. The test sample includes women aged between 16-59 
years old of all educational levels. Hence, if the effects are true, the magnitude should 
be larger in the main sample than the test sample. The benefit variable is the sum of 
AFDC, Food stamps and Medicaid benefits. The results are different between white and 
black women. For white women, the findings show positive welfare effect in cross-
section analysis and negative welfare effect in time-series analysis, which was expected. 
After some additional state-specific variables are included, the significance of the effect 
is dramatically reduced, but still significant. These coefficients are much smaller in 
magnitude in the test sample. Interestingly, when state fixed effect is included in the 
regression the coefficients of the welfare effect have their signs reversed; changing from 
positive to negative. However, note that this finding assumes no state variance. This 
could be due to unmeasured and uncontrollable social norms and values, which differ 
                                                 
36 See Haaga and Moffitt, 1998, p. 7 
Sorraya Yosyingyong                                                                                                    26
                        
  
among states. For black women, even though the results show a positive welfare effect, 
they show weaker and less significant correlations in the cross-section analysis 
compared to white women. This is not expected since black women form a larger 
proportion of beneficiaries than white women. Moreover, after state-specific variables 
are included, the significance of the welfare effect coefficients is retained. However, the 
positive welfare effect vanishes once the contemporary benefit levels are replaced by 
lagged benefits. Moffit (1998) reviews more recent studies on the subject, which use 
cross-sectional data, and concludes that while there are some correlations between 
higher levels of welfare and lower marriage rates, the magnitude of the impact is 
considerably smaller and arguable. Additionally, the impact of specific programmes 
may vary depending on the group being studied.  
 
On the other hands, there are also numerous studies that found insignificant welfare 
effect on marital decision. For example, Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1999) examine the 
impact of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) on female headship 
decision in the U.S. The AFDC provides cash assistance to low-income families with 
dependent children. Historically, AFDC37 has been approachable toward single-parent 
families than traditional two-parent families. In essence, it requires that the child has to 
be deprived of support from a parent due to death, incapacity and divorce/separation. 
However, for two-parent families to be eligible for AFDC, they must satisfy a work 
history requirement and are not allowed to exceed 100 hours of work per month while 
receiving the benefits. This eligibility to two-parent families was in place in 1988 and 
the programme is referred to as AFDC-UP (AFDC Unemployed Parent). The authors 
employ data from the Survey of Income and Programme Participation (SIPP). They find 
an insignificant impact of AFDC on female headship. Consequently, Moffitt (2001) 
reexamines the time series of changes in female headship and variation in real benefits 
with more attention paid to the role of wages as trends in headship explanation. The 
author includes male and female wages as the correct specification. The motivation 
behind this study arises from the inconsistency of the signs of the welfare effect on 
                                                 
37 AFDC assistance was funded by the federal funds to match each state’s expenditures on the programme 
and the eligibility criteria are set by the federal government. AFDC was replaced by the Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) on the 1st July 1997 which provides states much greater latitude in 
determining eligibility and benefit levels through the block grant system (Haaga and Moffitt, 1998).  
For more information on AFDC and TANF see 
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aid_to_Families_with_Dependent_Children] and 
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TANF] respectively. 
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female headship between cross-sectional and time-series studies. He uses data from 
March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1986 to 1996. Only men and women 
aged between 18-65 years with less than high school qualification are chosen. The 
author stratifies the sample in each year by birth cohort and race (only black and white 
are included). For each birth cohort and race in each year, a mean male and female wage 
rate and a female headship rate are calculated. Hence, the author derives a time series 
data of female headship, male and female mean wage rate and welfare benefits for less 
educated males and females for 1986-1996. The author plots the graphs of the changes 
in trends of female headship and benefits to show the changes in time-series form, the 
graphs reveal that prior to 1976 the two variables showed a crude positive correlation. 
In essence both variables were on a rise; however, the correlation disappeared 
thereafter. After running a regression analysis, with AFDC and Food stamp included, 
the welfare coefficient is positive prior to 1976 and turns negative thereafter. When 
Medicaid is included in the regression, the coefficient is positive before and after 1976 
but is very weak and insignificant after 1976. Then, the author add female wages into a 
time-series headship equation and finds that it reverses the AFDC coefficient from 
negative to positive after 1976 and makes the positive coefficient prior to 1976 more 
positive. Moreover, after adding the male wage, the benefit coefficient becomes more 
positive. Therefore, the author concludes that male and female wages could explain the 
inconsistency between cross-sectional and time-series correlations. Additionally, his 
results show that the decline in the male wage for less-educated men has impacted 
female headship rates than an overall upward trend in female wages, therefore, male 
wages might play a crucial role in explaining the changes in headship trends in time-
series, this characteristic applies to both black and white samples.  
 
Additionally, Hoynes (1995) claims that early studies could not reach a consensus on 
the welfare effect on partnership formation for three possible reasons: (i) the largely 
unobservable social norms, cultural effects and religious influences in different states, 
(ii) endogeneity of state policy and (iii) the omission of individual effects. In her view, 
state effects include the policy endogeneity and individual effects through the different 
composition of the population across states that in turn influence the generosity of 
welfare benefits in each state. Therefore, by not controlling for state fixed effects, the 
results of how welfare impacts female headship decision can be biased. In her study, she 
finds that once the model is correctly specified to include individual effects, the welfare 
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programme does not explain the increasing incidence of female-headed households for 
either blacks or whites. Hu’s study (1998) also provides new evidence for the AFDC 
effect on marital decision of poor women. He conducts a different experiment to test the 
welfare effect. He does not rely on women’s responses to year-to-year change in 
benefits across states like other studies. He conducts a randomised experiment in 
California that creates exogenous variation in welfare benefits. He recognises certain 
circumstances that would allow women to receive the benefits and is able to distinguish 
between the transitions into and out of marriage. His findings suggest that incentives 
created by the AFDC influence women’s marriage decisions, especially among poor 
women; higher AFDC benefits significantly increase divorce rates for poor two-parent 
families. The effects are larger if a woman is in a higher-benefit regime for longer 
periods of time. However, he finds no evidence that higher AFDC levels either 
encourage or discourage marriage among single-parent families.  
 
 
There have not been as many studies of the impact of the tax system only on family 
formation decisions in comparison to that of the welfare system. One interesting paper 
is by Ellwood (2000) who examines how the expansion of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC)38 might impact relationship formation as well as work incentives. The 
author conducts the “difference-in-difference” by exploiting the fact that changes in the 
EITCs would impact different groups of people differently. He claims that EITC 
negative impacts working single parents while positive impacts low-wage non working 
single parents. Theoretically, EITC could either positively or negatively impact marital 
decision depending on individuals. He suggests that if forming a union, results in the 
household’s income falling in the phase out range, this obviously reduces the incentive 
to get married. However, for some people, especially low-income earners EITC would 
result in additional household’s income which in turn could influence the second earner 
in a family to alter their working behaviour. For instance, if EITC increases total 
earning of a husband, a low-income wife might consider working fewer hours or in 
                                                 
38 EITC is a refundable tax credit which is designed to reduce or in extreme case eliminate taxes that low-
income people pay. Also, in some cases, EITC acts as a wage subsidy to some low-income earners. EITC 
has undergone a couple of expansions in 1986, 1990, 1993 and 2001. EITC is believe to be today’s one of 
the largest anti-poverty tools in the U.S. The credit is separated into three phrases (i) phrase-in range 
where the credits increases as the earning increases, (ii) plateau range where the maximum credit is 
earned and any additional income does not affect it and (iii) phrase-out range where the credit decreases 
as the earning increases. Note that the credit rates depend on numbers of children as well (Wikipedia: 
EITC)  
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some extreme cases quitting her job, this could help reduce stress in a family in various 
ways. Therefore, in this context, EITC could result in higher incentive to get married.  
 
The author uses data from Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to observe 1,671 
marriages between 1983 and 1991. This time frame was chosen in order to avoid 
behavioural changes of people in the sample due to the changes in EITC introduced in 
1996, the crucial fact of which could have caused misinterpretation of the real EITC 
effect on marital decision (this method helps avoid the endogeneity of marriage cost 
measure with marriage decision which was ignored in Eissa and Hoynes, 1999 above). 
The author conducts a natural experiment based on the fact that in 1990s American 
social and tax policies went under major reforms with EITC expansion and tightened 
welfare programs. Hence, very low-income non working women who are on benefits 
would have higher incentive to get married than ever since benefits are less available 
and EITC rewards marriage of working childless individual and non-working parent. 
On the other hand, skilled women with relatively well paid jobs are more likely to 
receive marriage penalty caused by EITC. The author finds that after controlling for 
year effects the marriage rate of low educated women is not relatively higher than high 
educated women as expected. However, he suggests that the EITC expansion should 
encourage cohabiting couples to have higher incentive to marry. After the observation, 
the author finds that in the data cohabiting couples show higher rate of marriage, 
suggesting the EITC effect on marriage. However, the author suggests an analysis using 
longitudinal data needs to be conducted in order to provide more convincing test of the 
impact of EITC on marriage decision.   
 
Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1998) use the sample of low-income families with children 
from the Survey of Income and Programme Participation to calculate the marriage 
subsidy/penalty in association with the AFDC (the predecessor to TANF), Food stamps, 
Supplemental Security Income and federal and state income taxes. They found that 
marriage results in marriage penalty for some groups of people such as low-income 
women. Although the calculations in these two papers are factual, there was no 
empirical evidence on whether or not these marriage subsidies result in changes in 
marital behaviour of low income families. Also Dickert-Conlin and Houser’s study 
(1999) attempts to investigate the impact of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on 
female headship decisions by employing data from the Survey of Income and 
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Programme Participation (SIPP). Before controlling for individual effects, the EITC’s 
impact on female headship was ambiguous. However, after the individual effects are 
controlled for, they find that ETIC’s impact varies depending on the ethnicity of women 
in the sample; higher EITC results in higher female headship rates for white women and 
lower female headship rates for black women. Then Dickert-Conlin and Hauser (2002) 
re-attempt to find the existence and magnitude of the welfare effect. They parameterise 
the financial incentive caused by AFDC and EITC and establish a connection between 
these changes and changes in female headship in America. The authors use 1990, 1991, 
1992 and 1993 panels of SIPP which provides longitudinal data controlling for 
individual fixed effects as suggested by Ellwood (2000). They use aggregate measure of 
AFDC and EITC generosity to run a regression analysis and find a little impact of EITC 
on female headship. The authors narrow down the sample to women aged between 18-
50 years dropping those who are widows and have their marital status changed from 
married to not married to avoid bias and confusion. Also, they exclude women who 
report an increase of more than 2 years of education in a one year period or a decrease 
in years of education. The authors state that families with children are chosen in their 
study because they receive the largest EITC and hence should be mostly affected by 
changes in EITC. In order to control of endogeneity of marriage decision as a result of 
changes in EITC, the authors assume that the state and federal laws are exogenous to 
individual behaviour and hold constant each woman’s family, demographic and income 
characteristics from the first year a woman is in the sample and calculate what would 
her EITC has been in later years if all the characteristics are maintained. The authors 
employ the two-stage least square approach for their estimation. They find a very small 
negative EITC effect on marriage decision for the overall women with children sample. 
However, after controlling for individual fixed effects and endogeneity, the authors find 
that EITC has no effect on the decision. Hence, they run the same regression on other 
two samples, which are women with children who were married and women with 
children who were unmarried in the first period in SIPP panel. For the sample of women 
with children who were married in the first period in SIPP panel, after controlling for 
individual fixed effect and endogeneity, an increase in EITC encourages married 
women to remain married but the economic effect is small. For the sample of women 
with children who were unmarried in the first period of SIPP panel, the results are 
similar to those married women with children but the coefficient of the EITC effect is 
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statistically insignificant at standard levels. However, this analysis uses a reduced form 
specification, which seems to influence the results to an extent.  
 
 
Eissa and Hoynes (1999) attempt to examine the impacts of tax and transfer programs, 
mainly EITC, on marital decision of females in America using the 1985-1998 March 
Current Population Survey (CPS). They state that because EITC is based on family 
income and has the same schedule applied to all taxpayers with children regardless of 
their marital status, hence EITC is non-marriage neutral. The authors estimate a discrete 
choice model of propensity to be married taken into account the changes in EITC and 
transfer system. Basically, this study employs the changes in marriage tax consequences 
and changes in propensity of marriage over time to reveal whether EITC could impact 
marital decision of American women. Hence, the authors model a marriage decision as 
a function of tax-transfer cost of marriage, individual and marriage market 
characteristics. They use variation in taxes from tax Acts between 1984 and 1997 to 
identify tax-transfer consequences of marriage. The authors include the state-fixed 
effects in their regression analysis since it has been testified in earlier studies that the 
effects could bias the findings of welfare effects. They employ the stock rather flow 
concept of marriage due to some limits in the data panel; in essence it is very small and 
offers a few transitions crossing states. The authors calculate the marriage 
subsidy/penalty and find that over time the subsidy and penalty has changed differently 
depending on the income and composition of each family but overall the likelihood of 
facing marriage subsidy has declined. And after examining marriage trend over the 
study periods, the authors notice a dramatic decline in the marriage rates among less 
educated men and women. They find a very modest tax-transfer effect on the decision. 
In essence, if excluding transfer program mainly AFDC in the analysis, a reduction in 
EITC marriage penalty by $1,000 would increase the marriage propensity by 1.3 
percent. However, if including transfer in the analysis, a reduction in EITC marriage 
penalty would raise the marriage propensity by 2.4-3.3 percent. Also, the authors find 
that on average EITC seems to promote marriage among couples with annual income 
less than $25,000 and seems to discourage marriage among couples with annual income 
greater than $25,000. Similar to most studies in this area, the results are different 
between black and white females in essence that tax seems to be more important to 
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white women while transfer payments are more important to black women. However, 
this study ignores the endogeneity of tax costs measure with marriage decision. 
 
Alm, Dickert-Conlin and Whittington (1999), offer a theoretical framework for how 
both tax and welfare systems could impact marriage through either the marriage subsidy 
or penalty39. Moreover, they also suggest which population groups are more likely to be 
impacted by these marriage subsidies and penalties. They provide the hypothetical 
couples with different levels of earnings, and analyse how changes in earnings would 
impact relationship formation decisions of individuals due to the marriage penalties and 
subsidies arising from the EITC and Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF). They 
conclude that, theoretically, marriage penalty seems to be incurred by people with 
similar earnings because their combined income is more likely to push them into a 
higher tax bracket and face the phase-out range of the EITC than when they are single, 
and they also pay more income taxes as a married couple. In contrast, any two people 
with dissimilar levels of earning will receive marriage subsidy, especially if one has no 
earnings or receives a very low wage. This is because the spouse with higher income 
will automatically be moved into a lower marginal tax bracket applicable for both the 
EITC and the income tax. Thus, the combined tax burdens of the two partners can be 
substantially reduced. For TANF programme, its eligibility is not based on legal marital 
status but on living relationships. TANF assumes that unrelated individuals do not 
provide financial assistance to the TANF unit even if they are cohabitating. In contrast, 
it assumes that related parents do contribute financially to the household. Thus, they 
conclude that when low income sole mothers marry either the natural father of their 
child or an unrelated male with dissimilar incomes, it can result in large penalties in the 
transfer system. This also happens in conjunction with large subsidies in the income tax 
system. Alm and Whittington’s study (1999) employs individual longitudinal data from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and find that probability of marriage is reduced as 
the marriage penalty increases, with a 10 percent increase in the marriage penalty 
resulting in a 12.5 percent fall in the probability of the first marriage.  
 
 
                                                 
39 A negative change in income after marriage is referred to as marriage penalty, whereas, a positive 
change in income after marriage is marriage subsidy. 
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The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) was established to replace the 
AFDC in 1997 as well as a launch of the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training 
(JOBS) programmes. It was a respond to much criticism and concern of the 
unintentional impact of the welfare system including disincentives to work, welfare 
dependency and the implicit disincentives effect on family formation and fertility 
decision. Thus, the government enacted the new federal law called Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), which 
was designed to minimise these problems if not eliminate them. Additionally, prior to 
the PRWORA, in early 1990s many states were granted waivers so that they could have 
some authority to amend their AFDC programmes. Half the states adopted some sort of 
waiver between 1993 and 1995. The main features of both PRWORA and state waivers 
include work requirements, financial sanctions, time limits, liberalised earning disregard 
(in essence that lower tax rates on earned income was implemented while people were 
on benefits so that they had more incentive to work), increased limits on assets and 
expanded eligibility for two-parent families. Consequently, the PRWORA and state 
waivers resulted in numerous fundamental changes in most welfare programmes’ 
eligibility requirements and their payments mechanism40.  
 
There have been numerous studies conducted to examine whether or not the reform had 
any influence on marital and childbearing behaviours41and the findings have been 
mixed depending on various factors, including which programmes established after the 
reform were being examined and the ethnicity of the individuals in the sample. The 
following section summarises the empirical evidence of how the welfare system might 
impact marital decisions, especially of women. Fitzgerald and Ribar (2001) examine 
how welfare reform waivers impact female headship decisions of mothers. Their study 
controls for confounding local economic and social contextual conditions. They use 
data from 1990, 1992 and 1993 panels of the Survey of Income and Programme 
Participation (SIPP) and employ proportional hazard models to measure the entry and 
exit from female headship and they also estimate models for levels of female headship 
to find that work encouraging waivers are associated with lower levels of female 
headship. However, the evidence is rather limited. Additionally, they find that other 
                                                 
40 See PRWORA [online]; Bitler et al, 2004, p. 216; Gennetian, 2003, p. 3 
41 Explicitly measuring the welfare effect by either examining the reform as a whol, or specific 
programme implemented after the reform. 
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waivers including family caps, teenage co-residence requirements and termination limits 
have insignificant effect on lowering the number of single-parent families.  
 
Bitler et al (2004) specifically analyse whether or not the welfare reform increased 
people’s incentives to marry. They use data on marriages and divorces during 1989-
2000 periods to study the influence of welfare reform including state waivers and the 
TANF and other state-level variables, on flows into and out of marriage. The results 
indicate that both state waivers from the AFDC programme and the PRWORA results in 
fewer new marriages and fewer new divorces. However, the results on marriage are 
quite sensitive to the choice of specification. They suggest that this can be a result of the 
greater financial dependency of low income women channelling through the new 
emphasis on work. Consequently, this could discourage women to seek a partner to get 
married to. Similarly, Acs and Nelson (2001) use data from the National Survey of 
America’s Families (NSAF) to examine whether or not changes in living arrangements 
in American families could be explained by the PRWORA, which has explicit goals of 
encouraging marriage and maintenance of the traditional two-parent families. They find 
that a reduction in sole parent families is more apparent among those who are more 
likely to be affected by the act. Moreover, their study shows that there is an increase in 
the proportion of children living with parents who are cohabitating and a less apparent 
increase in those living with married parents. They claim that these changes are more 
pronounced mainly in the years following the introduction of the PRWORA. However, 
these results are not definitive since there could have been other unmeasured factors 
behind the changes such as changes in parenting attitudes and economic growth. These 
two authors subsequently conduct another thorough study in the same area. Acs and 
Nelson (2004) conduct a multivariate difference-in-difference using 1997 and 1998 
NSAF, which provides information regarding household composition and the living 
arrangements of children in 13 states. They mainly focus on low-income families who 
are more likely to be affected by the welfare system. They find that more effective 
collections of child support and family cap policies have some correlations with lower 
sole parent families and higher two-parent families. However, the authors suggest that 
these results need to be interpreted with caution because the data used in their study is 
only a short time after the 1996 welfare reform. Therefore, longer term impact of the 
reform is still in question. 
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There are some other studies that find no impact of the reforms on the family decision. 
Kaestner and Kaushal (2001) design a quasi-experiment to analyse the impact of the 
welfare reform on marriage rates. They use the US Current Population Survey from the 
year 1994 and 1999 specifically choosing three groups of low-educated women aged 
between 18 and 44 years who are foreign-born citizens, foreign-born non-citizens and 
native-born citizens from. Their findings suggest that the TANF reforms and the AFDC 
waivers have no effect on marriage decision of native and foreign-born citizens. 
However, Schoeni and Blank (2001) conduct a study of the impact of the waivers and 
the 1996 welfare reform on sole parenthood and marriage rates and find that both the 
waivers and the 1996 welfare reform are associated with higher marriage rates and 
reductions in the levels of sole parents. They control for the differences between waiver 
and non-waiver states (in essence that waiver states show a worse economic 
performance) and education, unemployment rates and employment growth rates which 
could bias the welfare reform effect. They nevertheless note that the mechanism by 
which these impacts take place is not clear. It could be a result of changes in attitude 
and social norms, which are not controlled for in the study and thus interpretation of the 
welfare reform effect requires us to take these into consideration. 
 
Gennetian (2003) provides a systematic review of various studies on the effect of 
welfare reform policies on marital behaviours and cohabitation decisions among single 
parent families. Different studies offer different findings and even though some subtle 
effects of the reform on marriage and cohabitation among single parents can be found, 
some of the best evidence from the studies in her analysis suggests that the effect is 
rather small and insignificant. Consequently, if policy makers desire to increase the 
marriage rates, they will need to design new policies beyond what was established in the 
1990s reform. After the analysis, she concludes that the incremental differences in 
welfare and employment policies are not the primary determinant of single parents’ 
marital decision-making. Moreover, the reform was intentionally designed to affect 
employment, income and receipt of public assistance and the economic incentives 
provided by the reforms are not sufficient enough to influence marital behaviours.  
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3.3 Impact of welfare and tax systems on childbearing (fertility) decision
Note that as it is previously mentioned in the introduction chapter that child bearing 
decision that could be influenced by the welfare and tax systems is not the main focus in 
this study.  
 
In the context of how welfare can impact women’s decisions regarding fertility and 
childbearing, the findings have been generally inconclusive, with some studies finding 
that there is a small impact while others finding no impact at all. As with the impact on 
the marital decision, the findings of welfare effect on fertility decision vary depending 
on ethnicity. However, it is argued that many studies in this area leave open questions of 
causality and the directions of influence of welfare programmes of interest. 
Consequently, the findings are considered as indicative rather than definitive.  
 
Robin and Fronstin (1993) attempt to investigate whether or not changes in AFDC 
benefit levels could impact the family size decision of non-married women. They 
employ Current Population Survey data for the years 1980 to 1988 to conduct a Poisson 
regression analysis controlling for other factors that could bias the effect of the AFDC. 
The authors find the AFDC benefits effect varies depending on the education levels and 
ethnicity of mothers. In essence, that basic AFDC benefits do positively impact the 
family size of low-income non-married white and Hispanic women but not for black 
women. However, they find that the additional AFDC payments do not have any 
impacts on family size decision and therefore suggest that eliminating or reducing the 
additional payments would not necessarily reduce the out-of-wedlock birth rates. 
moreover, the authors find that the basic AFDC benefits do positively impact the 
familiy size of high school dropouts whereas they do not impact high school graduate. 
Therefore, the authors suggest that the AFDC should be restructured in such a way that 
it encourages women to finish high school. They thus conclude that the results of 
welfare programmes on fertility and family size have been mixed, and there is no 
overall clear-cut direct relationship between AFDC (benefit levels or differentials) and 
family size. 
 
Schultz (1994) investigates whether or not the increases in the out-of-wed-lock child 
birth could be caused by the generous welfare benefits. He examines this in conjunction 
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with the changes in the labour market which result in the variation in the market wage 
opportunity to both women and their partners. In essence, the wage variation of both 
women and partners are controlled in order that the welfare effect could be isolated. The 
author does not restrict his sample only among teens and he also studies the fertility 
behaviour of unmarried along side with married women. He claims that this could 
reduce unbiased estimation of the welfare effect. He includes the AFDC, food stamp, 
Mediaid and Unemployment Parent benefit (UP) in his study. He employs the data of 
black and while women from the 1980 US census. Both Tobit and OLS regression are 
tested. However both of them give out very similar results, therefore, the author only 
reports the OLS results which are easier to interpret. He finds that the AFDC effects are 
negative and statistically significant only among the women in the 15-24 age groups, 
while Medicaid has consistent negative effects on all age groups of women. 
Nevertheless, the author suggests that because the effects size are modest, therefore, the 
claimed unintended welfare effects on fertility of low-income women are not 
responsible for the alarmingly increases in the out-of-wedlock childbirths.  
 
Acs (1994, 1996) investigates whether or not the baseline benefits and the incremental 
benefits paid to the second child would create an incentive for low income mothers to 
have more children. He conducts a discrete time hazard model using data from National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). He uses the model to estimate the problability 
that a birth takes place at a specific time, conditioned on the fact that it has not already 
taken place. He finds that when the state fixed-effects are not controlled, there is no 
evidence that both the baseline benefits and the additional benefits paid to the 
subsequent child impacted women aged below 23 years old to have the second child. As 
a result, he suggests that the welfare reforms which would put some restrictions on 
benefits for young mothers who are already on the benefits might not be very effective. 
 
Lundberg and Plotnick (1995) develop an empirical model of premarital childbearing 
for young women in which premarital pregnancy, pregnancy resolution and the 
occurrence of marriage are all decision variables. They include state welfare as well as 
abortion and family planning policies as independent variables since all these 
programmes can alter both the costs and benefits of the decisions. They employ data on 
young women from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). They find that 
for young white women, all three variables: welfare, abortion and family planning 
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policies, do have significant effect on premarital pregnancy, pregnancy resolution and 
the occurrence of marriage before the birth. In contrast, they find no evidence that 
young black women respond to these variables when making decisions regarding 
fertility. Similarly, one of Plotnick’s studies in 1990 finds that, after conducting a 
regression analysis, the AFDC programme could cause young white women to have an 
incentive to have out-of-wedlock childbirths. However, he does not find the same effect 
among young black women. But he notes that this could be because the young black 
women sample is smaller than that of the white. He uses the data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth from 1979 to 1984.  
 
Fairlie and London (1997) investigate the relationship between incremental AFDC 
benefits and births of subsequent children, to reflect the increase in family size. They 
use micro data from the 1990 Panel of the Survey of Income and Programme 
Participation (SIPP) for the sample of their study. They include women aged between 
15 and 44 years old who have at least one child. They employ a logit equation to 
estimate the probability of a higher-order childbirth among the sample. They firstly 
found a positive coefficient estimate on the additional AFDC payment to the second 
child. However, they could not tell whether or not this could be because the omission of 
important immeasurable state-level or family size-level characteristics. As a result, they 
need to compare their finding with a control group: a nonrecipient group. Their findings 
indicate a positive but statistically insignificant effect of the incremental benefit levels 
of the AFDC and fertility on NONRECIPIENT groups. The effect of the non-recipient 
groups is larger than the positive correlation for AFDC recipients. Consequently, they 
infer that the family caps, designed to eliminate the additional financial gains from 
subsequent children, should not have a large impact. An anonymous author42 conducts a 
study using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Women. The author attempts 
to examine the impact of both the level of AFDC benefits and the increment, 
conditional on subsequent births as well as the effect of benefit policy and childbearing 
on AFDC recipients. After using a single-equation probit to estimate the effects, the 
author finds that childbirths which do occur are positively correlated to the incremental 
AFDC benefits. However, AFDC female recipients are NO more likely to give birth 
compared to non-participants, over the five years of the study. Additionally, after a 
nested logit framework is employed so that birth and welfare participation decisions can 
                                                 
42 Clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm 
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be estimated sequentially, the evidence supports the claim that AFDC benefits are found 
to be an important factor determining the post-birth participation decision. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that AFDC encourages subsequent childbirths of AFDC 
recipients.  
 
Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) conduct a regression analysis based on differences across 
countries in the levels of government financial assistance for families in 22 countries 
including New Zealand, from 1970 to 1990. They examine cash benefits such as family 
allowances and maternity leave, both the length and level, and their impact on the 
fertility decision simultaneously. However, they exclude benefits related to childcare, 
housing, education, health and low-income and single-parent benefits. They find that 
maternity pay has an insignificant impact on fertility levels while higher cash benefits 
are associated with a significant and positive impact on fertility. Moreover, the impact 
of cash benefits is greater for the first child compared to that of subsequent children. 
Nevertheless, the impact is relatively small. Rozzelle (2003) examines cross sectional 
data on out-of-wedlock childbearing from 50 states in the U.S. for the year 2000. He 
attempts to account for differences in the percentage of unwed mothers across the 50 
states by using per capita income, percentage below the poverty level, race/ethnicity 
(percentage Asian, percentage African-American and percentage Hispanic), percentage 
of the population without high school degree and welfare payment levels as control 
variables. His findings suggest that while per capita income, race/ethnicity and poverty 
levels have quite a significant effect on out-of-wedlock child birth, surprisingly, the 
levels of government financial assistance have an insignificant effect.  
 
 
Moreover, Robins and Fronstin (1993) investigate the correlation between welfare 
benefits and family-size decisions of never-married women. They examine whether or 
not AFDC benefit levels are systematically associated with a larger family size of 
never-married women. They apply a Poisson regression model to the Current 
Population Survey data from the years 1980 to 1988 and find that the welfare effect 
varies depending on ethnicity of never-married mothers. For white and Hispanic 
women, the findings suggest a positive welfare effect on family size, whereas there is no 
evidence of a relationship for black women. Nevertheless, the study finds virtually no 
effect of incremental AFDC levels on family-size decisions, implying that elimination 
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of these increments will not significantly reduce the number of illegitimate births. 
Moreover, the basic AFDC benefit levels do positively affect the family-size of high 
school dropouts but not of high school graduates suggesting that altering AFDC benefit 
structure in such a way that single mothers are encouraged to complete high school may 
discourage out-of-wedlock births. The authors caution that selection into education may 
be an important factor, in which case a targeted policy might not have an effect at all on 
out-of-wedlock childbirths. 
 
The following summarises the evidence of the welfare reform and its impact on fertility 
decisions of low-income women. After the reform, the main programme established to 
impact on the fertility decision and adopted by numerous states was family caps, which 
was designed to reduce fertility among benefit recipients. It is believed to reduce 
fertility by means of financial penalties; if a mother on welfare has a subsequent child 
while on benefits, her benefits do not rise with the extra child. Consequently, the costs 
incurred from a bigger family size are not covered by family cap policy. Time limit 
policy was another government policy after the reform in 1996, which is believed to 
have some effects on fertility decisions. Time limits eliminate benefits as a means of 
long-term income for AFDC recipients and thus implicitly makes having children 
become rather expensive. Nevertheless, most studies either find no or insignificant 
effects of the reforms on the fertility.  
 
Horvart and Peter (1999) investigate which welfare waivers are effective at reducing the 
out-of-wedlock childbirths and how it differs across races and age groups. Their study is 
based on state-level panel data for the year 1984 to 1996. They include two groups of 
women in their study: women aged between 15-19 years old and women aged between 
20-49 years old. Three racial groups are included: all women (white, black, Asian and 
others), white (white Hispanic) and black (black Hispanic). Their regressions for each 
age group and race have the following as the independent variables: (1) sum of the 
AFDC and food stamp guarantees for a family of three; (2) state poverty rate; (3) 
number of AIDS cases reported in each state weighted by the state population; (4) ratio 
of whites to blacks in the state’s population; (5) number of abortion providers in the 
state per 1000 women of childbearing age; (6) the proportion of the state’s population 
that adheres to a religion defined as “fundamentalist” 10; (7) the high school completion 
rate among 18-24 year olds not currently enrolled in high school; (8) the proportion of 
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the population that lives in an urban area; (9) a binary variable which equals one when 
sexuality and sexually transmitted disease education is required in state public schools; 
and (10) state and year dummies to account for unobserved heterogeneity across states 
and time. After conducting the regression analysis, the authors find that some welfare 
waivers have a negative correlation with out-of-wedlock childbirth. They suggest that 
family cap may be effective at reducing the non-marital childbirths. Time limits do not 
seem to have a long term effectiveness in reducing the non-marital childbirth. They also 
find that the negative coefficient of the AFDC-UP is only limited among the 15-19 
years old women.  
 
Dyer and Fairlie (2003) find an opposite finding from that of the previous research. 
They employ Current Population Survey data from 1989 to 1999 to examine the impact 
of family caps on non-marital birth rates. The authors include five states in which 
family caps were implemented as “natural experiments” by comparing trends of non-
marital birth rates in these five states to trends in states where family caps were not 
imposed, as well as other waivers prior to the PRWORA. They use a difference-in-
difference estimation approach, by including multiple comparison groups and 
controlling for differential time trends. They find no evidence suggesting that family 
caps reduced out-of-wedlock childbirths among single and less educated women with 
children. Hoynes (1996) also supports this finding.   
 
Joyce et al. (2004) use birth and abortion records from 24 states in the U.S. to examine 
the effect of family caps on fertility rates. They differentiate women who are at high risk 
of government financial assistance by using age, marital status and levels of schooling. 
They also use number of previous live births to identify those who are most directly 
impacted by the family cap. The authors find that both states with and without family 
caps have a similar pattern of births and abortions; birth rates fell more and abortion 
rose more among women with high risk who at least had one previous live birth 
compared to childless women. Thus, the authors conclude that while the effects of 
welfare reform are different between mothers and childless women, there is no 
convincing evidence of an independent effect of the family cap. 
 
Muljo et al (2003) conduct a difference-in-differences estimation to investigate the 
relationships between time limits on out-of-wedlock childbirths. They get the sample 
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from the Current Population Survey March Supplement data. They use three different 
treatment/control groups: single/married, poor/rich and welfare-recipients/non-
recipients. They find no evidence that time limits reduce out-of-wedlock childbirths 
among teenage girls. Consequently, they suggest that time limits may as well create 
more financial burden on low income women since they make it more difficult for these 
women to support themselves and their children. 
Noticeably, there are quite a number of studies conducted on the influence of the 
income tax system alone and in conjunction with welfare systems on the decisions to 
form a family for low income individuals through the marriage subsidy and penalty. In 
contrast, research on how the combination of welfare and tax programmes can impact 
fertility and child rearing decision is significantly less thoroughly documented. One of 
the papers in this area is by Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003), who investigate 
whether or not the expansion of the EITC promotes motherhood. They hypothesise that 
since the EITC expansion in credit largely restricts eligibility to family with children, 
this may encourage childbearing especially among those with low income. They 
examine birth rates during 1990s, the first births of women from U.S. birth certificates 
between 1990 and 1999 maintained by the National Center for Health Statistics. The 
authors choose a sample of women with less than a college education since they are 
most likely to be affected by the EITC expansion. The authors control for state and 
demographic characteristics and employ variation in state EITC programmes over time 
to identify the EITC effect on fertility of women in the sample. Their findings suggest 
that EITC is positively and statistically significant, and affects the first birth rates 
among non-white, married women which is contradictory to most of the welfare 
literature that finds larger effects of transfer on fertility for white women. The authors 
suggest that the different findings could be because of the fact that the EITC works 
through the labour market and white and non-white families may be different in terms 
of their earnings and labour force participation. 
 
Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003) conduct the study to answer the question of 
whether or not EITC actually increases fertility due to its generosity to families with 
children. They suggest that due to the EITC expansions in 1990s, the incentives to have 
children for certain recipient groups increase. However, due to the complexity of the 
EITC’s effects on subsequent children seems to be quite complicated, the authors only 
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focus their study on the first birth. The authors use the birth rate data over 1990s from 
the US birth certificates from 1990 to 1999, controlling for state and demographic 
characteristics. Then the authors exploit the variation in EITC over time to identify and 
compare the changes in the birthrates and the changes in EITC to capture the connection 
between these two variables. The authors narrow down the sample to only low educated 
mothers with one child. In order to control for population differences across different 
states in the study, the authors divide the sample in to different cells and normalize them 
by a measure of “at-risk” population results in a total of approximate 20,000 cell 
observations. Similar to most studies in this area, the trends in fertility rates differ 
among races. For white women, the first birth rates in states with EITC are lower than 
those without EITC throughout 1990s and both trends have stayed relatively unchanged. 
In contrast, for non-white women, the first birth rates are higher in states with EITC 
than those without and the trend in states with EITC has grown noticeably faster than 
states without EITC. The results found in non-white women sample suggest some 
effects of EITC on the first birth decision. Then the authors turn to a regression analysis 
to properly estimate the EITC effect on fertility. They include other policy variables 
which could influence fertility decision such as AFDC/TANF. All policy variables are 
lagged by one year. The authors split the sample by races since most of earlier studies 
show that results vary by races. Also, they split the sample by marital status since EITC 
applies to different status differently. They find that for white unmarried women, EITC 
has a small negative impact on the first birth rate whereas it has an expected negative 
impact on the first birth rates of non-white unmarried women. Both groups, however, 
show a very small economic significance. For married women, EITC positively impacts 
both non-white and white women’s first birth rates. This study’s findings are different 
from others study of EITC’s impacts on family and fertility in essence the EITC effects 
are larger among non-white rather than white families. 
 
 
Another study is by Milligan (2005) who examines the impact of a non-taxable ‘baby-
bonus’ introduced by the Quebec Government in Canada in 1988. Parents would receive 
certain amounts of government payments for their first and subsequent child(ren) paid 
as an advance on income tax credits. They would be paid until the child began school. 
However, the programme was suspended in 1997. The author uses statistics and micro-
data from the census for the years 1980 to 1997. The author conducts a regression 
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analysis controlling for state and individual characteristics and finds that the 
introduction of the new tax policy results in higher fertility rates. Moreover, the author 
also finds that young single mothers are unresponsive to the baby-bonus policy, whereas 
higher income earners are most responsive to the bonuses. However, he notes that due 
to the time period of the policy introduction, he cannot establish whether the policy 
leads to a temporary shift or a real increase in total fertility. Whittington (1993) 
investigates whether the changing tax value of state and federal exemptions for 
dependents has any impact on fertility decisions of 229 married couples. The results 
suggest that the federal exemptions positively and significantly affect fertility, while the 
state exemptions do not. The author then concludes that income tax exemptions do 
impact on fertility decisions of married couples depending on the size of the exemption. 
Moreover, the generosity of these exemptions is quite important to determine the level 
of impact. 
Conclusions
The up-to-date empirical evidence of economic incentives of low income women to 
become sole parents and choose specific living arrangements with their partner arising 
from welfare programmes and tax policies suggests that the government policies do 
have some impact on single parenthood and fertility. However, the more variables are 
controlled for, the more welfare and tax effects become weaker and rather insignificant. 
Moreover, the findings vary depending on method used, sample of observations, 
programmes studied and other crucial factors. Even though the more recent studies 
suggest that welfare and tax effects are small, this does not mean that the effects should 
be ignored or abandoned.  
 
Moroever, it is also worth noting that there are some similarities between New Zealand 
policy context and that of the U.S. In New Zealand the marriage penalty and subsidy 
operate via the welfare benefit system, not through the income tax system43. This major 
difference of the government policies’ impact on families arises from the differences in 
the units of assessment between the welfare benefits and income tax systems. 
Consequently, the pattern of the impact found in the U.S. may not be entirely applicable 
to what might have been the impact of the welfare benefits and income tax systems 
                                                 
43 See The New Zealand Families Commission, 2006, p. 17 
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found in New Zealand (the structure of the welfare and tax systems in New Zealand will 
be elaborated in more detail in chapter five). This literature review section is just the 
guideline of what have been done in this area of study overseas. 
 
As a result, this study will particularly useful to New Zealand since, firstly, there has 
not been many studies in this area in New Zealand and, due to some dissimilarities 
between New Zealand’s welfare and tax systems and overseas where most studies in the 
area are conducted, some of the findings aforementioned may not be applicable to New 
Zealand. Secondly, New Zealand’s welfare system has undergone a number of major 
changes since the latest study in this area conducted in the country.  
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Chapter Four: Background of the demographic changes in New Zealand for the 
past few decades. 
 
This chapter provides some background of the changes in demographic characteristics 
pertaining to family formation and other related areas, such as childbearing and marital 
decisions in New Zealand for the past few decades44. It has been acknowledged that 
during the past 50 years, there have been significant demographic changes especially 
changes in structures of family formation in New Zealand. The underlying changes 
include the noteworthy shifts in family formation norms, nuptiality patterns and 
reproductive behaviour, the increase in de facto or common law unions and a large 
increase in the divorce rate, which will be elaborated in more detail subsequently45. 
These changes have focused attention on the possible role of government policies in 
bringing about these changes. Additionally, as previously mentioned in chapter one the 
target population groups in this study are certain groups of females, the following 
sections will extensively focus on marital behaviour and childbearing changes involving 
New Zealand women in past decades. 
 
 
Note that, admittedly, there are a number of different types of sole motherhood such as 
being unmarried (those who choose it from the outset), being separated/divorced (those 
who choose to leave the two person relationship) and being widowed (those who are left 
with children), however, this study is concerned with incentives for partnering given 
current single status. Accordingly, we do not distinguish between the different paths to 
their current single status. Nevertheless, these different paths might suggest different 
propensities for re-marrying (women who have been married before are more likely to 
marry (again) compared to women who have never married), but our focus is on 
financial incentives, which are the same for all these different types of single women. 
Therefore, we are not going to make the distinction about the different paths to sole 
parenthood.  
 
 
 
                                                 
44 See The New Zealand Family Commission, 2006, p. 14 
45 See Key Statistics, 2001, p. 7 
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4.1 Changes in marital behaviour 
One dramatic demographic change regarding family context that New Zealand has 
witnessed during the last couple of decades is the changes in marital behaviour. The 
most significant marital behaviour change includes the relative consistent fall in 
marriage rates and the continuous growth of divorce rates of New Zealand women46. 
The same pattern of both the decline in marriage rates and the rise in divorce rates is 
also demonstrated elsewhere such as the U.S and Europe47. Graph 4.1 clearly 
exemplifies the aforementioned trends of marriage and divorce statistics of New 
Zealand women during the past 30 years.  
 
Graph 4.1 clearly shows the continuous rapid fall in the proportion of New Zealand 
women whom are married from nearly 65 percent in 1971 to quite a bit below 50 
percent in 2001. In contrast, the proportions of New Zealand women whom are never 
married, separated and divorced have steadily been on a rise, while those whom are 
widowed have been relatively stable. Graph 4.2 specifically demonstrates the changes in 
partnering up rates48 of women only, the data of which is contained in the Household 
Labour Force Participation (HLFS). The HLFS is discussed in more detail in section 
8.2. Noticeably, graph 4.2 demonstrates a decline in partnering up rates of New Zealand 
women over time. This is consistent with the overall decline in the general marriage rate 
of New Zealand female population prior shown in graph 4.1. 
 
Moreover, it is also well documented that a larger proportion of the female population, 
especially younger females, marry at an older age49. One of the reasons behind this 
underlying marital behaviour change is that cohabitation or de facto relationships is 
believed to have become more of a common form of first union, and are preferred over 
marriages. As a result, the proportion of the population who are cohabitating or in de 
factor relationships has been on the rise, especially among the population in their 
thirties50. Although, it has been acknowledged that some cohabiting couples are more 
likely to consider marriage at a later stage of their relationship, the possibility of for 
                                                 
46 See Focusing on Women, 2005, p. 3 
47 See Zhan and Pandey, 2004, p. 661; Morissens, 1999, p. 4 
48 Recall chapter one explaining in New Zealand marriage and cohabitation are treated equally. Thus, in 
the HLFS, marriage and cohabitation are in the same category. Partnering up therefore includes both 
general marriage, which is legally registered, and cohabitation. 
49 See The New Zealand Family Commission, 2006, p. 14; Statistics New Zealand, 2005, p. 58 
50 Recall that in New Zealand, the law has the same recognition for both legal marriages and 
cohabiting/de facto couples. See Key Statistics, 2001, p. 8 
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these couples to be ultimately married has reduced51. The following tables are the 
statistical figures testifying these changes in marital behaviours of New Zealand women 
over the past decades.   
 
When looking at women of all age groups, table 4.1 clearly illustrates the upward trend 
of proportions of women who are unmarried at younger ages. When breaking down into 
different age groups, this upward trend is significantly apparent among younger age 
groups. It can be seen that women among 16-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 age groups have 
experienced the continuous increasing upward trend. On the other hand, although 
women among 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, and 55-59 age groups have evidenced the 
overall increase in the proportion of never-married women from 1961 to 2001, the 
increases were not continuous. Due to some factors, the proportions of unmarried 
women of these age groups experienced a downward trend during 1966 to 1991. 
However, the downward trend has shifted to an upward trend. It is quite interesting to 
observe that older women aged 60 years and over have shown no sign of increase in 
proportion of never-married women throughout from 1961 to 2001. In contrast, 
proportions of never-married women among these older age groups have been 
declining. Table 4.2 represents the median age at marriage of women, by marital status 
when married. 
 
Table 4.2 clearly shows that New Zealand women have delayed marriage until quite 
substantially later on in their lives, regardless of their previous marital status. However, 
the delay in marriage is the most significant among those never married women (the 
first column). It can be seen that among single women who married for the first time, 
the median age has been considerably extended from 21.9 to 28.1 years old in 1981 to 
2004 respectively. While widows and divorcees have also experienced the delay in re-
marriage, the increases in median age of these two groups are not as drastic as spinsters. 
Considering that most marriages are of those who were previously single, it is not 
surprising to observe the median age of all brides (last column) to encounter 
comparatively the same increases in the median age as spinsters.  
 
Furthermore, the number of unions each woman experiences has been increasing. At the 
same time, the rate of dissolution of unions which increased throughout the 1960s until 
                                                 
51 See Key Statistics, 2001, p. 8 
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the 1990s stabilised thereafter52. As a result of these frequent breakdowns in unions, 
larger proportions of the population who were previously partnered are re-partnered (a 
third of the female population in New Zealand re-partners within 2 years after the 
breakdown of their previous relationship)53. The table 4.3 demonstrates the changes in 
divorce rates of females in New Zealand since 1995. 
 
It can be seen in table 4.3 that when breaking down the divorce (dissolution) rates into 
different age groups; women of all age groups have noticeably illustrated the same 
slight upward trend in the divorce rates since 1995. Women aged between 16-19 years 
have shown the most volatile changes in the divorce trends. Moreover, women aged 
between 20-24 years have experienced the most significant increases in the divorce rates 
from 17.4 to 23.9 divorces in 1995 and 2004 respectively. However, when looking at 
divorces of all age groups of New Zealand women, the divorce rates have been 
reasonably stable during 1995 to 2004. 
 
4.2 Changes in childbearing behaviour 
 
The following is the background of the changes in the childbearing pattern of New 
Zealand women, and how family related issues have changed over the past decades. In 
general, there has been a decrease in the fertility rate54 in New Zealand due to women 
having their first child at an older age compared to previous cohorts55. Moreover, it is 
also because New Zealand women now prefer to have fewer children and some women 
may entirely forgo motherhood56. Consequently, the family size has transited from 
relatively large to relatively small families. Note that although the fertility rate overall 
has been declining, it does not necessarily mean that the fertility rate of certain female 
population groups has been following this pattern.  Graph 4.3 and table 4.4 illustrate the 
changes in the fertility rates during the past decades. 
 
From graph 4.3 and table 4.4 it can be seen that since 1961 New Zealand has started 
experiencing a decline in the total fertility rates with a noteworthy drop from 
                                                 
52 See The New Zealand Family Commission, 2006, p. 14 
53 See Ibid, p. 14 
54 Fertility rate refers to the average number of births a woman would have during her life if she 
experienced the age-specific fertility rates of a given period (usually a year) (Statistics, 2005, p. 32) 
55 See The New Zealand Family Commission, op. cit., p. 14 
56 See Statistics [Demographic Trend 2005], 2005, p. 32 
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approximately 4.0 to just below 2.0 births per woman in 1961 and 2004 respectively. 
The drastic drop in both of the fertility rates were between 1961 and 1981.  Although 
there was a slight increase in the total fertility rates from 1987 to just before 1994, there 
has been no change in the direction of the trend rates thereafter. The rates have been 
continuously declining for the last 50 years. Additionally, the declining completed 
fertility rates also suggest that each year following 1961 each New Zealand woman has 
borne a fewer number of children on average.   
 
The next underlying demographic change is that, while both the total and completed 
fertility rates have been experiencing a downward trend, the rate of childbirth outside 
marriage57 (ex-nuptial or out-of-wedlock childbirth) was noticeably on a rise up until 
1996 and has declined thereafter58. This increase in the rate of out of wedlock 
childbirth, as well as the increasing rate in the breakdown of unions including divorce, 
have been claimed to might have contributed to an increasing incidence of sole parent 
families. The incidence of sole parenthood in New Zealand firstly started being publicly 
noticed in the 1980s and the rates have been continuously increasing since then. By 
1991, the incidence of the sole parenthood in New Zealand was comparatively the same 
as that in the U.S., and had been increasing at a faster rate59. The increasing ex-nuptial 
fertility rates in New Zealand are also demonstrated in the table consisting of different 
types of fertility rates presented above. From the table 4.4, it appears that while the 
actual statistical figures of the ex-nuptial fertility rates have slightly altered each year, 
New Zealand has been witnessing the upward trend of the ex-nuptial fertility rates since 
1962. The most apparent increases were during the year 1986 and 1995. Moreover, the 
variations of the changes in the ex-nuptial rates have been more vulnerable than the 
rates of total fertility rates. 
 
Moreover, according to Goodger and Larose (1998, p. 7), the number of single mothers 
increased by 135 percent from 1976 to 1991. Also the number of traditional, basic two-
parent family units, which is normally referred to as the “nuclear family”, has been 
declining60 (refer back to graph 1 and table 1). The trend of changes in family formation 
and structure are illustrated in graph 4.4 and table 4.5. 
                                                 
57 Note that this only includes general marriage not cohabitation. 
58 See Statistics [Demographic Trend 2005], 2005, p. 14 
59 See Whiteford, 1997, p. 16 
60 See Nolan, 2003, p. 3 
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As it can be seen from graph 4.4 and table 4.5, the number of sole parent families rose 
up from just above 10 percent in 1976 to nearly 30 percent in 2001. Moreover, it can 
also be seen that the majority of sole parent families are mother only families, and this 
proportion of the population has been increasing significantly compared to the growth 
of male single parent families. In contrast, the proportion of couples with children has 
been gradually declining since 1986. 
 
However, one crucial factor which has to be taken into account when analysing sole 
parenthood trend in New Zealand is that, although some of these women with 
dependent children might not be legally married with their partners, they could share 
custody of their child with the child’s birth father. Moreover, if a woman’s current 
partner is not a biological father of her child, but is in a relationship with her, she is not 
considered to be a sole parent family. Consequently, we have to be more careful when 
interpreting and using the term ‘sole parent’ because for some children, the parenting 
arrangement in reality may not fit with the definition of sole parenthood61.These 
demographic changes in family related areas that New Zealand has been experiencing 
are, to some extent, similar to the changes in other Western OECD countries62.  
 
Another factor which may have impacted on family and relationship formation and 
child bearing decision-making aside from the government policy is the recent changes 
in male patterns of education and employment63. It is argued that men’s educational 
achievement relative to women’s has fallen over time64. Accordingly, men with low or 
no qualifications are believed to face difficulty in acquiring employment and therefore 
sustainable income to support a family. This has led such men to become “unattractive” 
in the marriage market. Also, women have become more financially independent over 
the past years. Callister (2001), for example, argues that the falling partnership rates, 
especially of men with low income and low or no qualifications, are mainly a 
consequence of the declining rate of educational achievement of New Zealand men 
                                                 
61 See The New Zealand Family Commission, 2006, p. 14; Callister and Hill, 2000 
62 See The New Zealand Family Commission, op. cit., p. 15 
63 See Ibid, p. 14 
 
64 See Ibid, p. 14 
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rather than any other cause65. Nevertheless, this does not rule out the impact of the 
government policy on relationship and family formation decisions. 
 
Take into consideration that these demographic changes have also been accompanied by 
other social, economic and cultural changes. According to Prasad66: 
 
  “…in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
introduction and easy availability of the 
contraceptive pill combined with the legalisation of 
abortion gave sexually active couples, particularly 
women, far more control over family planning. At 
the same time, the expansion of higher education 
and training, changing expectations regarding 
relationships and roles within families, and greater 
social and financial independence for women had a 
significant impact on subsequent fertility 
decisions…” (Prasad, 2005, p 4) 
 
As a result, when analysing whether or not New Zealand’s welfare benefits and income 
tax policies and their changes over time may have impacted on family formation and 
living arrangement decisions of the target group population in this study, we must take 
into account the possibility that these social, economic and cultural changes could have 
also impacted these demographic changes. In my descriptive analysis of the issue, 
therefore, I try to examine all these trends in detail in order to separate, to the extent 
possible, the impact of welfare and tax policies from these other factors, on these 
demographic changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
65 See The New Zealand Family Commission, 2006, p. 14 
 
66 See Ibid, p, 14 
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Graph 4.1: Changes in marriage and divorce rates of New Zealand women from 
1971 to 2001
 
Source: Focusing on Women, 2005, p. 3. 
 
 
Graph 4.2: Changes in partnering up rates of women in the HLFS from 1986 to 
2004
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Source: HLFS data set provided by the Department of Labour. 
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Graph 4.3 : Changes in pattern of fertility rates over the past decades in New 
Zealand
 
Note: 
(1) Total fertility rate refers to the average number of births a woman would have during 
her life if she experienced the age-specific fertility rates of that year. It excludes the 
effects of mortality. 
(2) Completed fertility rate refers to the average number of children a woman born in a 
particular year has had during her lifte. The figures for 1956-1971 birth cohorts are 
estimates only. 
Source: Statistics New Zealand, 2005, p. 31 
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Graph 4.4: Trend in changes in family formation and structure in New Zealand
 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand  
Derived from http://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/documents/2005/sr05-people.pdf 
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Table 4.1: Changes in percentage of females who are never married, by age 
groups, since 1961, in New Zealand
 
Age
group
(years) 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
16-19 91.7 90.3 89.1 89.9 95.4 97.7 98.6 99.1 99
20-24 40.5 38.9 35.3 37.1 52.3 65.7 77.6 85.3 88.7
25-29 12.5 11.8 10.7 11.6 16.9 28.4 39.2 51.4 60.3
30-34 8.1 6.9 5.9 6.1 7.8 12.4 19.6 27.7 35.8
35-39 7.3 6 5 4.6 5.2 6.7 10.1 15.9 22
40-44 7.5 6.2 5 4.4 4.4 5 6.1 9.2 13.9
45-49 8.3 6.7 5.5 4.7 4.3 4.3 4.8 5.9 8.6
50-54 9.7 7.7 6.2 5.2 4.6 4.3 4.3 4.7 5.6 
55-59 10.7 9.3 7.3 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.3 4.1 4.5 
60-64 11.2 10.3 8.9 7.1 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.3 3.9 
65 and 
over 12.4 11.8 10.7 9.9 8.7 7.5 6.5 5.8 4.8 
All ages 20.1 20.8 19.6 19.8 21.8 24.3 26.7 28.2 29 
 
Note: Figures for 1961 and 1966 are based on the census night population counts. 
Figures from 1971 onwards are based on the 
census usually resident population counts. 
 
Source: (modified) Statistics New Zealand, 2005, p. 6 
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Table 4.2 : Median Age at Marriage of women, by marital status when married in 
New Zealand.
December
year
Never
married Widow Divorcee 
All
Brides
1981 21.9 53.2 34 23 
1982 22.2 53.3 34.4 23.6 
1983 22.6 53.1 34.5 23.9 
1984 22.8 53.8 34.7 24.2 
1985 23.1 53.7 34.9 24.4 
1986 23.4 53.8 35.5 24.8 
1987 23.7 52.7 36 25.2 
1988 24.0 53.4 35.9 25.5 
1989 24.2 53.3 36.5 25.8 
1990 24.5 53.1 36.5 26.2 
1991 24.6 52.6 36.7 26.5 
1992 24.9 52.8 37.1 26.7 
1993 25.2 53.8 37.9 27 
1994 25.5 54.4 37.9 27.3 
1995 25.8 53.1 38.3 27.7 
1996 26.1 52.8 38.2 28 
1997 26.5 54.6 39.1 28.4 
1998 26.7 53.0 38.9 28.6 
1999 27.0 54.6 39.4 28.8 
2000 27.4 53.9 39.8 29.3 
2001 27.5 53.8 40.2 29.5 
2002 27.6 53.8 40.3 29.7 
2003 27.7 54.7 40.9 29.8 
2004 28.1 54.5 41.7 30.2 
Note:
(a) Marriages registered in New Zealand. Before 1999, marriage data were extracted on 
the basis of 'date of marriage' (ie occurrence). From 1999 onwards, marriage data have 
been extracted using 'date of registration'. 
(b) Marriages from 1991 onwards are based on marriages registered in New Zealand of 
bridegrooms resident in New Zealand. Before 1991, marriages are based on marriages 
registered in New Zealand of bridegrooms resident in New Zealand and bridegrooms 
visiting from overseas. 
(c) Marriages before 1952, where both parties were Mäori, are excluded. 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand, 2005, p. 65. 
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Table 4.3: Divorce rates
 (1)
 of New Zealand women since 1995
 
        
             
December 
year             
Age 
groups 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
16-19 6.2 4.3 9.8 4.3 6.6 9.9 6.5 7.4 6.3 4.1
20-24 17.4 18.3 19.3 19.7 20.1 17.7 19.6 20.6 22 23.9
25-29 22 22 21.6 22.9 22.4 22.2 22 23 24.3 23.2
30-34 19.9 20.6 20 21.5 20.6 20.4 20.5 21.9 22.3 22.1
35-39 17.1 17.2 17.1 17.9 18.1 17.4 18.3 19.2 19.5 20.5
40-44 15.7 16.1 14.8 14.7 15.3 15.6 15.2 17.1 17.2 17.6
45-49 11.4 13.1 12.9 13.4 12.9 12.9 12.7 14.5 14.9 14.9
50-54 7.9 8.4 8.3 8.5 8.9 9.3 9.3 9.9 10 11
55-59 4.6 5.2 5.7 5.3 5.6 5.3 6.2 6 6.9 6.8
60-64 2.7 3 3 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.6 3 3.2 3.5
65 and 
over 1 1.3 1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.4
All 
Ages 12.2 12.6 12.2 12.6 12.4 12.1 12.1 12.8 13 13.1
 
Note: 
(1) Orders for dissolution of marriage granted in New Zealand per 1,000 mean married 
estimated resident population in each age group. 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand, 2005, p. 71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sorraya Yosyingyong                                                                                                    59
                        
  
Table 4.4: Changes in different types of fertility rates including Ex-nuptial 
(childbirth outside marriage) birth rate 
 
Note: (1) Per 1,000 estimated mean population. 
(2) The average number of live births that a woman would have during her life if she experienced the age-specific 
fertility rates of a given period (usually a year). It excludes the effect of mortality. 
(3) The average number of daughters that a woman would have during her life if she experienced the age-specific 
fertility rates of that year. It excludes the effect of mortality. 
(4) The average number of daughters that a woman would have during her life if she experienced the age-specific 
fertility and mortality rates of that year. A NRR of one means that a woman would exactly replace herself. 
(5) Ex-nuptial births per 1,000 estimated mean not-married women aged 15–49 years. 
(6) The total fertility rate and reproduction rates for the Mäori population are based on the ethnicity of the child for 
the de facto population and on the ethnicity of the mother for the resident population. 
(7) From 1 September 1995, a new ethnicity question was asked on the birth registration form. This new question 
(based on the concept of self-identification) collects more Mäori births than the previous degree-of-blood question. 
As a result, any change in patterns may reflect definitional changes rather than an actual change in fertility.  
(a) Rates from 1991 onwards are based on live births registered in New Zealand to mothers resident in New Zealand 
by date of registration and the mean estimated resident population. Before 1991, rates are based on live births 
registered in New Zealand to mothers resident in New Zealand and mothers visiting from overseas by date of 
registration and the mean estimated de facto 
population. 
(b) Rates for 1998 are lower than expected because of a small change to the rate at which births were registered 
during 1998. 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand, 2005, p. 45 
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Table 4.5: Changes in proportions of Families with dependent children, by family 
type, in New Zealand
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand Derived from     
http://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/documents/2005/sr05-people.pdf
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Chapter Five: Background of the New Zealand’s tax and welfare systems and 
how they have evolved.
  
5.1 New Zealand’s Tax system
 
Personal income tax has three main objectives. The first objective is to raise the 
revenue for the government in conjunction with the other two main components of 
revenue raising tax bases which are GST and excise taxes95. The second objective is 
to alter people’s behaviours as the tax incentive changes. Theoretically, as the tax 
structure, including tax rates and abatement regime change, people tend to behave 
accordingly in order to keep their financial payoff, and hence their utility, maximised. 
The third objective is to reduce income inequality in the society96. The income tax 
system in New Zealand used to be a progressive system with narrow bases and high 
rates, which is believed to underpin the development of the welfare system97 as 
explained in chapter Two. However, for the past 35 years, the income tax policy has 
experienced a shift towards a “broad-base, low-rate” combination while the 
progressive system has been sustained98. The new broad-base and low-rate 
combination within the income tax system is believed to be the fairest99 and most 
efficient100 revenue-raising method in our current modern and open society101. Over 
these periods, government expenditure as a proportion of the national income has 
decreased which has helped lay off the pressure on the income tax system and has 
enabled the new broad-base and low-rates combination to be imposed102.  
 
However, in order to achieve this flat scale and broadening base combination in the 
income tax system, the government has had to impose some other changes; taxation of 
fringe benefits and superannuation were introduced. Moreover, there has been a 
                                                 
95 See Tax Review 2001 Final Report, 2001, p. iii 
96 See Tax Review 2001Issues Paper, 2001, p. 86 
97 See Nolan, 2005, p. 20 
98 See Tax Review 2001Issues Paper, op. cit., p. 86 
99 In essence that the tax payment is charged according to how much money people earn, therefore, 
people with higher disposable income pay higher tax than those with less income, and some of the tax 
revenue is distributed to the poor. This helps reduce the tax incidence of people with a lower ability-to-
pay, since it shifts the incidence disproportionately to those with a higher ability-to-pay (Wikipedia, 
Progressive Tax, 2008). 
100 In essence the tax revenue can be raised while causing the least dead weight loss and the least loss 
of the production capacity of the economy. 
101 See Tax Review 2001Final Report, op. cits, p. i 
102 See Ibid, p. ii 
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greater use of withholding tax with the extension of the Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) 
system103. The PAYE is when employers collect an amount of employees’ salary or 
wage on behalf of the taxation authority. The deducted salary/wage paid to the tax 
authority is, in effect, a provisional payment of tax on employees’ income. The PAYE 
is designed to help reduce the amount of tax payable at the end of the year since the 
expected amount of tax that employees earn is collected during a year104. 
Furthermore, the resident withholding tax on interest payments and unimputed 
dividends was introduced105. Additionally, the complex system of personal income 
tax deductions and rebates for single-households and households with dependent 
children were either removed or consolidated106.  
 
Apart from the dramatic shift from narrow bases with high rates to broad bases with 
low rates, during the past 25 years more attention has also been focused on the 
composition of the tax-mix. The emphasis has been moved towards consumption 
taxes and away from the income tax107. In the early 1980s, New Zealand’s tax system 
relied heavily upon personal income as the main source of government’s revenues. 
However, since 1984 the personal income tax scale has been gradually made flatter 
with smaller rates and less variation between the rates. Moreover, the tax base has 
been made broader as well108. Graph 5.1 illustrates the shift from an excessive 
reliance on individual taxes towards other tax bases such as sale taxes, which was 
introduced in 1986109. 
 
The main reason for this change is the government’s realisation that New Zealand’s 
tax system was excessively dependent on income tax, especially through the PAYE 
system110. Moreover, it was believed that low and middle income workers were 
impacted the most by the old income tax system. The original “narrow-rate, high-rate” 
income tax system resulted in the tax burden being shifted to middle-income workers 
since they were pushed into a higher tax bracket for the same given amount of 
                                                 
103 See Tax Review 2001 Issues Paper, op. cit., p. 11, 86 
104 See Wikipedia, 2007. 
105 See Review 2001 Issues Paper, 2001, p. 86 
106 See Nolan, 2005, 30 
107 See Ibid, p. 4-5, 29-30 
108 See Tax Review 2001, 2001, p. 85 
109 See Ibid, p. 8 
110 See Tax Review 2001 Final Report, 2001, p. 8 
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income111. Moreover, in combination with the welfare system’s abatement rules, this 
heavily affected those with low and middle income working families. Consequently, 
these families were struggling to make an appropriate living out of their labour 
earnings. Therefore, some of these people might have had little incentive to enter the 
labour force or consider working fulltime112. Although, after these changes over time, 
the upper tax rates have been reduced quite heavily, the amount of the tax revenue 
collected has been roughly sustained113. Basically, as it can be seen above, the 
reforms of the income tax policy in New Zealand have been motivated by the labour 
supply incentive concern114, not by the family formation and structure issues.   
 
The unit of assessment for the income tax system has always been the individual and 
not the household (except for the period between 1939 and 1960115)116. The intuition 
behind the individual tax base has originated from the Land and Income Tax Act 1891 
which stated that “every person” shall be liable to be taxed upon their income’. 
Consequently, the individual has remained as the basis of assessment117. Table 5.1 
elaborates on the changes in the tax rates and income threshold brackets since 1986. 
Note that the income figures are in nominal, not real terms. 
 
It can be seen from table 5.1 that the taxable income brackets have been broadened 
and the tax rates have been lowered. These income tax reductions have been claimed 
to broadly benefit low and middle income earners118. However, some of the higher 
income earners will have benefited from these tax reductions from two channels. 
Firstly, some of their earnings would fall in the lower brackets and as a result it would 
be taxed at lower rates119. It can be seen that although the lowest income bracket ($0-
$9500) as well as the tax rate (15 percent) for this bracket have not been changed 
since 1986, other income brackets and their tax rates have been changed constantly. 
Given the fact that most earners get more than $9,500120, which would put them in at 
                                                 
111 See Tax Review 2001 Final Report, 2001, p. 8 
112 See Nolan, 2005; Birch, 1996, p. 9 
113 See Tax Review 2001, 2001, p. 85 
114 See Nolan and Fairbrother, 2005, p. 14 
115 See Nolan, op. cit., p. 20 
116 See Tax Review 2001, op. cit., p. 96 
117 See Scott, 1993, p. 61 
118 See Birch, op. cit., p. 22 
119See Ibid, p. 26 
120 See Ibid, p. 22 
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least the second income bracket, and given the significant changes of the tax rates in 
this bracket since 1986, we can clearly expect some impact on decisions regarding 
family formation and structure, especially by single mothers with low-income. 
 
 
5.2 New Zealand’s Welfare system
 
New Zealand’s welfare benefit system was originally designed to counteract poverty 
and hardship due to temporary unemployment spells. The system was designed based 
on the economic and social environment of low and temporary unemployment and 
where the common family type consisted of couples with children and the males were 
the main bread-winners121. Consequently, the welfare system provided the assistance 
to a husband and a wife as a single income sharing unit122.  
 
Originally, the income support through the welfare benefits system in New Zealand 
was deemed to reflect an emphasis upon two principles which were residual and right-
based principles. The residual principles have been maintained through other policies 
designed alongside the welfare system, to ensure full employment and to provide 
adequate market earnings for breadwinners in families. The residual principles 
emphasise self-reliance and responsibility of individuals123. The right-based 
principles imply that the right to be entitled to the benefits is based on people’s status 
as citizens and thus the assistance is not delivered based on people’s previous 
financial contributions124. Thus, New Zealand’s system of income support through 
the welfare benefit system can be categorised as social assistance, rather than a social 
insurance125. Basically, the dominant goal of the welfare system has been to provide 
and maintain adequate levels of employment and therefore sufficient market incomes 
so that New Zealand families can avoid poverty and hardship126. Although the goal 
has not been primarily made to focus on family formation and other related issues, the 
assistance was provided in such a way that different levels of public support were 
influenced by the situation of different female population groups. Consequently, this 
                                                 
121 See Nolan, 2003, p. 2-3; Nolan, 2005, p. 16-17 
122 See Nolan, 2003, p. 18 
123 See Nolan, 2005, p. 19 
124 See Nolan, 2003, p. 3 
125 See Ibid, p. 3 
126 See Ibid, 2-3 
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affected the nature and timing of their support. Female widows were made the first 
priority group to receive financial assistance from the government, before deserted 
wives who came before single mothers. Deserted wives are those women have been 
deserted by their husband and are treated equivalently as widows127. The intuition 
behind this system was that household dissolution could be avoided and discouraged 
if different levels of assistance were given to these three female population groups128. 
 
The evolution of New Zealand’s welfare system is characterised by periods of 
continuous change and periods of no change at all129. According to Mackay (2001), 
there are three dramatically rapid evolutions of the welfare system. The first dramatic 
change was during the last years of the 19th century. The next evolution was during 
the 1930s and the latest one has been manifesting itself during the past couple of 
decades. The forces behind these three rapid reforms of the welfare system have been 
mainly due to the social and economic circumstances and the different goals and 
ideologies of different political parties who were governing the country at these 
times130. The social and economic circumstances could range from the concerns about 
the well-being of the states of the economy, unemployment rates, rising fiscal costs 
(large fiscal deficits), rising inflation rates, prolonged periods of being on the benefits 
for some groups of populations to the concern about the dependency of beneficiaries 
on the government’s support131. 
 
For the past couples of decades, there have been a couple of major reforms of the 
welfare system. The main changes involve the reallocations of funds and resources 
with the main emphasis behind the reforms being to strengthen participation in the 
labour market, reduce the scope for moral hazard132 and to constrain the fiscal 
costs133. Consequently, most welfare programmes were shifted toward targeted 
welfare programmes134. The targeted assistance is preferable compared to universal 
                                                 
127 See Social Security in New Zealand, 1972, p. 242-243 
128 See Nolan, 2005, p. 18 
129 See Mackay, 2001, p. 3. 
130 See Ibid, p. 3-4; 
131 See Mackay, Op. cit., p. 3-6; Nolan, op. cit., p. 12, 22-23; Nolan, 2003, p. 3 
132 Recall that the terminology of moral hazard theorises that economic agents do have incentives to 
behave in such a manner that is not expected of them prior to the contracts, especially when they are 
not monitored (Schotter, 2001, 295) 
133 See Mackay, 2001, p. 6; Nolan, 2005, p. 23 
134 See Mackay, op. cit., p. 6; Nolan, op. cit., p. 40-41 
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assistance because the well-being of those who are really in need of the government’s 
support can be efficiently delivered. Moreover, the fiscal costs of the government can 
be reduced due to greater targeting efficiency of the assistance135. And with more 
targeted assistance the residual principles can be further emphasised136.  
 
Moreover, most main welfare programmes were reduced in their real benefit rates in 
1991137. However, the supplementary benefits (tier two) and discretionary benefits 
(tier three) were made more generous after 1995138. Some examples of this increase 
in generosity of the tier two and three benefits include the increases in 
accommodation supplement (AS) and special benefits rates139.  In 1996, the 
abatement regimes for most benefit programmes were also adjusted. 
 
The followings elaborate snap shots describe how the welfare system reforms have 
taken place since 1986. Note that the more in-depth evolutions, including the changes 
in benefit rates, income threshold rates as well as abatement rates of DPB, UB, 
Family Support and Accommodation Supplement, will be discussed after these 
summary descriptions. 
 
 
 
Changes introduced in 1991
The reform took place in order for the welfare system to achieve the following 
objective: “to encourage self-reliance by providing people with sufficient motivation 
to move from state dependence to independence”140. The major forces behind the 
reform were motivated by the increasing numbers of people on a main welfare benefit 
such as DPBs and UB as well as the belief of the Treasury that benefit levels in New 
Zealand were comparatively high by international levels141. Additionally, there was 
also a problem of work disincentive due to high effective marginal tax rates 
                                                 
135 See Nolan, 2005, p. 24 
136 See Ibid, p. 19 
137 See Cox, 1998, p. vii, 20-24 
138 See Ibid, p. 20 
139 See Ibid, p. 20 
140 See Goodger and Larose, 1998, p. 18; Nolan, op. cit., p. 16 
141 See Nolan, op. cit., p. 26 
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(EMTRs)142, which for some workers could be as high as 100 percent143. Moreover, 
the increased budget deficit further strengthened the desire to have the welfare system 
reformed144.  
 
The following illustrates the major changes in 1991 in more detail. 
 
1. Generally, from April 1991 most benefit rates were cut quite stringently. 
Nevertheless, the cuts were not uniform; they varied according to the benefit 
types145. Sole parents whose main income was from the benefit system were 
impacted the most significantly as compared to other groups of 
beneficiaries146. Basically, those sole parents with one child and those with 
two or more children, who were on DPB and widows benefit, had their net 
weekly rates cut by 12.8 percent and 11.4 percent respectively. However, if 
these sole parents were also eligible for the family assistance programmes 
such as Family Support and Family Benefit, their reductions of benefit 
payments were 10.7 percent and 8.9 percent if they had one child and two or 
more children respectively147.  Note that due to the exclusion of the inflation 
adjustment after the reform, the reduction in the benefit rates in REAL terms 
was 14.5 percent for those with one child and 12.8 percent for those with two 
children148. However, single unemployed beneficiaries aged between 20-24 
years without children were affected the most by these benefit cuts149. Table 
5.2 simply illustrates the changes in the benefit rates before and after the 
reform, for the three components of the main benefits. 
 
It can be seen from table 5.2 that for all benefits, the average cut was about 10 percent 
after the reform in 1991. In contrast, the maximum benefit available for married 
couple without children only fell by three percent. Moreover, single unemployed 
beneficiary aged between 18-24 years faced 24.70 percent cut which was the biggest 
                                                 
142 EMTR refer to the combined loss from tax and abatement when an extra dollar is earned in the 
labour market (St. John and Rankin, 1998, p. 2). EMTR will be discussed in more details in chapter six. 
143 See St. John, 1993, p. 2 
144 See Mackay, 2001, p. 11 
145 See Ibid, p. 12 
146 See Goodger and Larose, 1998, p. 19; Nolan, op. cit., p. 26 
147 See Goodger and Larose, op. cit., p. 19 
148 See Ibid. p. 19 
149 See Mackay, op. cit., p. 12 
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cut. This was due to, firstly the benefit rates were reduced as a result of the reform in 
1991. Secondly, the age band for the youth rate was increased from 18 to 24 years. 
Consequently, those young and single people aged between 20 to 24 years were 
moved to the youth rate which was paid 20 percent less than the adult rate150 and the 
youth rate was also reduced by 5.8%. Consequently, the benefit cuts put most 
beneficiaries under additional financial pressure151. 
 
 
   2.   One of the Family Assistance programmes which was the universal     Family 
Benefit was abolished from 1 April 1991 as well. This abolition resulted in 
the addition of the extra $6 per week per child, which was originally the 
universal Family Benefit payment paid to families with children, onto the 
targeted Family Support programme152. 
 
 
 3.   The minimum age to be qualified for the DPB increased from 16 to 18 years of 
age from 1 April 1991153. 
 
  4.   The stand-down provisions for higher earners which originally applied only to 
the Unemployment Benefit were extended to apply to sole parents applying 
for DPB from 1 August 1999. 
 
 
5. The eligibility of the DPB was made a lot stricter in such ways that parents 
with shared or split custody would be facing different requirements and 
possibly some stood to lose the benefits154. From 1 October 1991, for the 
shared custody, only one parent was able to have the children taken into 
account in the eligibility assessment of the benefit. However, for those with 
                                                 
150 See Mackay, 2001, p. 12 
151 See Ibid, p. 12 
152 See Goodger and Larose, 1998, p. 19 
153 See Goodger and Larose, op. cit., p. 19 
154 See Goodger and Larose, op. cit., p. 19 
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split custody, only one parent was able to claim the DPB, while the other 
might be able to qualify for other benefits at the sole parent rates155. 
 
 
 
Changes introduced in 1996 
The reform in 1996 was a subsequent reform in order to reinforce the possibility of 
achieving the goal of the 1991 reforms. Moreover, the abatement regime, especially 
for sole parent benefit recipients, prior to 1996 was designed to encourage people to 
move off benefit entirely and acquire full-time employment. As a result, this created 
disincentives for these people to take up small part-time work in such a way that they 
would have to choose from either being on the benefit or acquiring a full-time job and 
abandoning the benefit completely156. Consequently, the main feature of the 1996 
reforms involved changes in the abatement regime157.  
 
1. The abatement schedule for the DPB and widow benefits recipients 
was altered158. The new abatement regime for these two benefits can 
be seen in table 5.3. 
 
From table 5.3, the welfare system before the reform in 1996 was much more 
stringent in term of quite heavy abatement rates. Thus, the reform in 1996 resulted in 
a more generous welfare system through the increased income threshold levels and 
the broadened income abatement threshold ranges. This new abatement schedule was 
established in order to encourage certain beneficiary groups to consider employment 
and at least move into part-time work159. Theoretically, if economic agents believe 
that being in the work force will yield them a higher utility level than being 
unemployed and receiving benefits, they will have incentives to acquire a position, at 
least as a part timer, in a labour market. It can be seen that after the reform, workers 
would be able to earn twenty dollars more market earning before the abatement rule 
started applying ($80 compared to $60 prior to the reform). Moreover, they could earn 
                                                 
155 See Goodger and Larose, 1998, p. 19 
156 See Ibid, p. 19 
157 See Ibid, p. 19 
158 See Ibid, p. 19 
159 See St John, 1996, p. 9 
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an extra hundred dollars market earning before the benefit payments would start to get 
abated at 30 cents rate ($80-$180) compared to only an extra twenty dollars prior to 
the reform ($60-$80). Additionally, any extra market earning fallen in the $80-$180 
income range would be abated at the rate of 70 cents in relative to the rate 30 cents 
prior to and after the reform respectively. This deduction of 40 cents was believed to 
encourage economic agents to acquire more hours of work in the labour market. 
 
2. DPB recipients were required to have a work-test in 1996. Prior to 
1996 the DPB recipients were only required to have the income-test. 
This requirement resulted from the philosophy employed by the 
Employment Task Force which was that each individual’s right to 
benefit should be balanced by responsibility160. Moreover, this is also 
a response to the statistically low employment rates for sole parents 
and large difference between the employment rates of married and sole 
mothers. Therefore, in 1996 the work-test requirement of the DPBs 
was as shown in table 5.4. 
 
3. The UB component had new abatement rates and income exemption 
levels. The changes were as shown in table 5.5161. 
Changes introduced in 1998 
In 1998, there were a couple of changes made to the DPB and widows benefits which 
came into effect in 1 February 1999. These changes were also made in order to 
reinforce the goal of encouraging welfare recipients and those people who were 
looking into being on the benefits, to seek work. The changes attempted to increase 
the incentives for recipients to seek work rather than continue being on benefits162. 
The changes were also made in such a way that the barrier into employment could be 
reduced. Consequently, the main changes in the benefit system included: 
 
                                                 
160 See Goodger and Larose, 1998, p. 20 
161 See St John, 1996, p. 8 
162 See Goodger and Larose, op. cit., p. 17; Nolan, 2005, p. 29 
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1. Childcare assistance to help sole parents was increased in such a way 
that the costs of children were sufficiently met. 
2. Employment assistance for lone parents seeking work was increased. 
3. If sole parents were required to be temporarily away from work after 
moving off the benefits and moving into employment, they would be 
granted the interim income support in the first 6 months. 
4. Easier benefit debt collection for 3 months after the benefits were 
cancelled. 
5. Better information regarding child support was provided. 
6. The work-test for the DPBs was altered as shown in table 5.6. 
 
Note that for those who faced full-time work-test, the abatement regime was the same 
as those receiving Unemployment benefit, which was 70 cent abatement after $80 per 
week exemption163. Moreover, more child care assistance was made available to 
those parents with low or no income. 
 
The following sections include the summary of each welfare benefit programme 
included in this study in more details. 
5.2.1 The Domestic Purposes Benefit programme: Sole-parent (DPBs)
 
The DPB sole parent programme was introduced in 1973 to provide financial 
assistance to all categories of single parents including widowed and non-widowed 
sole mothers, separated or divorced sole fathers and widowed sole fathers. The 
justification behind the DPB was that due to the absence or the loss of the partner’s 
support, the sole parent families could be at risk, especially of poverty. Thus, given 
this state’s partial responsibility in providing some levels of financial assistance, the 
children of these single parent families are more likely to be less financially 
disadvantaged than otherwise164.  
 
                                                 
163 See Goodger and Larose, 1998, p. 20 
164 See Goodger, op. cit., p. 135 
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Although there has been a number of major changes made to the DPB regarding its 
benefit rates and the abatement schedule since 1986, in general in order to be 
qualified for the DPBs, the following eligibility requirements have to be satisfied165. 
1. eligibility 
 
-   must have qualifying child, usually under 18 and born in (or parent   ordinarily 
resident in) New Zealand 
- must be sole parent 
- must be 16 years or over (1986-1990) 18 years or over (from 1991) or 16 
years or over and have been legally married 
- must take reasonable action to obtain child support 
- emergency maintenance allowance maybe available to sole parents who do not 
qualify for DPB 
 
2. residential qualification 
- New Zealand citizen or granted permanent residence in New Zealand 
 
3. income test 
- Full benefit payable up to $60 a week from 1986-1995 and up to $80 per week 
from 1996. 
- benefit reductions up to 30 cents in the $60-$80 income range and 70 cents 
thereafter (1986-1996); benefit reductions up to 30 cents  
- child support payments made to Crown for beneficiaries 
 
Since 1986 the payment rates of the DPB have been shown in tables 5.7 and 5.8. 
Graph 5.2 illustrates the changes in the DPB’s real weekly rates since 1986. As can be 
seen, when taken into account of inflation, the DPB benefits for most types of 
beneficiaries have been by and large stable after the major benefit cuts in 1991. 
Noticeably, the DPB rates including FB/FS for single beneficiaries with 2 children or 
more have decreased since after 1999.  
 
                                                 
165 See Cox, 1998, p. 118-120; Goodger and Larose, 1998, p. 17 
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In order to analyse whether the DPB can impact the decisions of potential 
beneficiaries regarding their family and relationship formation, another piece of 
needed information is the abatement schedule of the DPB. Table 5.3 illustrates how 
the schedule has changed since 1986. 
 
 
5.2.2 The Unemployment Benefit (UB)
 
New Zealand has quite a significantly different unemployment benefit programme 
from that of other countries. The benefit is funded through the general revenue rather 
than through payroll taxes166. Moreover, it is not treated as an insurance scheme but it 
is essentially operated as a Negative Income Tax programme167. The UB programme 
is available to beneficiaries based on “need” which is defined by age, marital status, 
number and ages of children who are dependents168. Additionally, the benefits are 
automatically reduced or taxed away as the households’ other income increases. 
However, the benefits are not automatically suspended entirely if the beneficiaries 
have gained employment in the workforce, as long as the beneficiaries’ labour earning 
is still below the abatement thresholds169. Although, the UB has been through a 
couple of reforms since 1986 as previously stated, generally, the eligibility 
requirements which need to be satisfied in order to be qualified for the UB have 
reasonably remained stable for the last couple of decades. The following are by and 
large eligibility requirements for the UB. 
 
1. Eligibility 
 
- unemployed, looking for work and ready to start a job or training course 
- over 18 (or over 16 and living with a partner and dependent children) 
- job search allowance is available to single, independent 16 and 17 year olds 
- payments may stop for up to 26 weeks for those who do not comply with the 
requirements of New Zealand Employment Service (NZES) 
                                                 
166 See Maloney, 1997, p. 4 
167 See Ibid, p. 4 
168 See Ibid, p. 4 
169 See Ibid, p. 4 
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- waiting period for those with substantial other resources rather than labour 
market income, or who left a job because of misconduct or without good 
reason 
- not available to students or strikers 
 
2. payments to spouses/partners 
- payments made to both partners 
- joint assessment of income 
-    partners are required to look for look for full-time work (30 hours a week or       
more) if you have no children at home or your youngest child is 14 or older or
      -look for part-time work (15 hours a week or more) if your youngest 
child is 6-13 or
                  -come to annual planning meetings and perhaps do things to help   
prepare for work if your youngest child is under 6. 
 
3. residential qualifications 
-   New Zealand citizen or permanent resident 
-   must have lived in New Zealand for two years or more 
 
4. income test 
-   Full benefit payable up to $50 a week if a child is absent or $60 a week if a 
child is present. This rule applied from 1986-1996 
-   Full benefit payable up to $80 a week (including spouses’ income) from 1996 
to the present 
Benefit reduced by 70cents per additional dollar thereafter 
 
Source: Boston et al, 1999, 124-128 
 
 
Since 1986, the UB programme has undergone a number of reforms. The benefit rates 
have been constantly adjusted to accord with the state of the economy at various 
times. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 elaborate how the unemployment benefit NET rates for 
recipient without and with children have changed since 1986 respectively. However, 
in order to examine whether or not the UB rates have been more generous, these 
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nominal net rates have to be adjusted for inflation. The base year for the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) is the year 2004. Graphs 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the changes in the 
real UB net rates at change dates for beneficiaries without and with children 
respectively. 
From table 5.9, it can be seen that the rates do not specifically reflect the cost of 
having children. Unless Family Benefit/Support payments are taken into account, UB 
basic payments for married couples with children are the same regardless of how 
many children in the households. After looking at graphs 5.3 and 5.4, it can be seen 
that once inflation is taken into account, the UB payments for both beneficiaries with 
and without children are not as generous as they appear in tables 5.8 and 5.9. 
Noticeably, by and large most UB payments have been stable. However, once the 
FB/FS payments are included in the UB package, the amounts of real payments for 
single and married beneficiaries with 2 children or more seem to experience a 
reduction in the payments after 2000.
 
Only changes in the benefit rates are not sufficient to conduct an analysis of whether 
or not the welfare and tax systems could impact no/low income single mothers’ 
decisions regarding their relationship and family formations. The other important 
piece of information required is how the abatement rates/rules of the UB have 
changed since 1986. Table 5.5 illustrates the changes in the abatement rates and rules 
of the UB since 1986 up to the present. 
 
5.2.3: Family Assistance Tax Credits
Since the introduction of the Family Assistance Tax Credits in 1986, the assistance is 
now paid to the principal caregiver instead of the principal income earner170. The 
principal caregiver is defined as the person who is believed to have the responsibility 
to provide the day-to-day care of a dependent child on more than a temporary basis. A 
dependent child is defined as someone who is either aged 15 years or younger, 16 or 
17 and not working full-time or receiving a main welfare benefit, student allowance or 
other government assistance, or aged 18 years and still at secondary school or a 
                                                 
170 See Nolan, 2005, p. 47 
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tertiary institution171. Additionally, the principal caregiver does not necessarily have 
to be the child’s birth parent. In case of a shared custody arrangement, having more 
than one principal caregiver can be arranged172. For example, if the child’s parents 
are living apart, and they are both qualifying persons by having met all the eligibility 
criteria and that they care for their child for at least one third of the time throughout 
the year, both parents qualify as a principal caregiver173. For more historical 
information of the programmes and how they proceed please refer to Nolan, 2005. 
In order to be qualified for the Family Assistance programmes, the following criteria 
need to be met. The person has to; 
 1. be aged 16 years or over 
 2. be a principal caregiver of a dependent child 
 3. satisfy residency requirements which can be met in two ways 
  3.1 The person has been in New Zealand continuously for at least 12 
months at any time, is a tax resident and is in New Zealand at the time of application 
for the Family Assistance Tax Credit programmes, OR 
  3.2 The person has been caring for a dependent child who is both a tax 
resident and is in New Zealand174. 
 
There are a number of programmes included in the Family Assistance Tax Credits 
system. These programmes are Family Support, Family Tax Credit, Child Tax 
Credit/In-Work Payment and Parental Tax Credit175, 176. Note that for more 
information of Family Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit/In-Work Payment and Parental 
                                                 
171 See Noland, 2005, p. 47 
172 See Ibid, p. 47 
173 See Ibid, p. 47 
174 See Ibid, p. 47 
175 See Ibid, p. 47-57 
176 Note that the definition of income and periods of assessment (e.g., weekly, monthly, annual) applied in the 
Family Support programme’s entitlement and abatement regime are different from those that apply to other social 
welfare benefit programmes’ and to income tax liability (Nolan, 2005, p. 48, 127-130). This principle reflects the 
ability of the welfare and tax systems to provide effective target assistance. A comprehensive income definition 
applied for social assistance and income tax system can be difficult due to the government’s conflictio between 
efficiency objectives, equity objectives and objectives for reducing administration and compliance costs. 
Consequently, and elaborating differences in different objectives and goals of each programme, income definitions 
are different for personal income taxes, entitlement to social welfare benefits, and entitlement to Family Assistance 
programmes (Nolan, 2005, p. 127-8). As a result, These differences in income definitions arise in connection with 
the unit of assessment and time period for assessment, the treatment of assets and other income outside the existing 
tax base and the treatment of assets and other income of the self-employed (Nolan, 2005, p. 128) 
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Tax Credit please refer to an appendix F. These family assistance programmes are not 
included in this study177. 
 
Recall that New Zealand’s income tax system is assessed on the basis of individual 
income, whereas, social welfare benefits employs a household as the unit of 
assessment and a household-based social welfare definition of income, which includes 
wealth indicators (potential income indicator) and actual income received178. In 
contrast, Family Assistance programme employs the definition of income which 
compromises taxable income and the social welfare definition of income. It is based 
on an annual taxable income but using joint income of the caregivers rather than 
individual as the unit of assessment179. 
5.2.3.1: Family Support Programme
Family Support was introduced on 1st October 1986 in order to replace Family Care, 
the Family Rebate, the Principal Income Earner Rebate and the Family Maintenance 
Allowance180. It provides financial assistance to low-income households in the form 
of a refundable tax rebate, regardless of their work status181. Consequently, Family 
Support assistance is available to most families with at least one child aged 18 years 
and below182. The level of the assistance depends on the level of earnings, the number 
of children in the household and their ages as well as the arrangements of any shared 
care183. 
 
The abatement rules apply differently to partnered and single parent households184. 
 
- Partnered households: the assistance is abated against joint income of the 
caregivers. The income has to be adjusted for the proportion of the income tax 
                                                 
177 This is because this study is only a descriptive analysis as aforementioned in chapter one, and therefore 
including all the programs the women might be eligible for is really complicated. Accordingly, we decided to just 
include the main benefits in this study. 
178 See Nolan, 2005, p. 128 
179 See Ibid, p. 128 
180 See Ibid, p. 47-48 
181 See Ibid, p. 48 
182 See Family Assistance, 2006 
183 See Nolan, op. cit., p. 48; Family Assistance, 2006 
184 See Nolan, op. cit., p. 48 
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year that the households are eligible for the Family Support, namely the 
eligible period. 
- Single parent households: the assistance is abated against income of the 
caregiver adjusted for the eligible period
185
. 
It is acknowledged that since the introduction of the Family Support, it has provided 
greater assistance for the eldest child than for additional children186. After 1989, the 
assistance amounts also reflected the ages of children in such a way that the assistance 
was greater for older children than for younger children187. As can be seen from the 
table 5.12 which illustrates changes in levels of the assistance as well as abatement 
threshold levels since 1986, only between the years 1986 to 1989 did the ages of the 
children not impact the amounts of the entitlement. Note that the figures of the payments 
are based on annual payments. For the weekly payments, the figures are divided by 
52. 
 
From the table 5.12, it can be seen that Family Support provides a greater financial 
assistance for the eldest child than additional children, which reflects an assumption 
of economies of scale of having more children. This assumption states that each 
additional child incurs a lower marginal cost to the household188. Moreover, since 
April 1989 Family Support assistance has also reflects the recognisation of costs 
incurred as children age. It can be seen that the entitlement for older children is more 
generous than that for younger children189. In 1997, the third age group was 
introduced and children aged 16 to 18 received higher assistance than children aged 
13 to 15190. 
 
There were a couple of major changes in the Family Support payment arrangement 
since 1986. The followings elaborate how and what changes had occurred. 
 
  Two-spouse households 
 
                                                 
185 See Nolan, 2005, p. 48 
186 See Ibid, p. 48 
187 See Ibid, p. 48 
188 See Ibid, p. 48 
189 See Ibid, p. 48 
190 See Ibid, p. 48 
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- 1 October 1986 to 1 April 1990 
The Family Support payments were split between spouses equally if they were in a 
two-spouse household191. 
 
- 1 April 1990 onwards 
 
The Family Support payment was arranged in such a way that only principal 
caregivers will be paid the assistance192. 
 
  If spouses are separated 
- prior to 1987 
Only one spouse could receive the assistance which could include the Family Benefit. 
- after 1987 
The change was made in such a way that the assistance of both Family Benefit and 
Family Support would be split between spouses. 
- In 1991 
 
Due to the suspension of the Family Benefit in 1991, the government came up with a 
new system for the splitting of the Family Assistance Payments. Consequently, 
between 1 April 1991 and 1 April 1993, both spouses could be eligible for the family 
assistance payments if they were the principal caregiver for 4 out of every 12 weeks. 
However, after 1 April 1993, this was changed such that both spouses could only be 
eligible for the assistance only if they were the principal caregiver for 1/3 of the 
income-tax year193. 
5.2.4: Accommodation Supplement
 
The Accommodation Supplement (AS) programme was established in 1993 to replace 
the Accommodation Benefit (AB)194 and the Housing Corporation’s subsidized rents 
                                                 
191 See Nolan, 2005,  p. 51 
192 See Ibid, p. 51 
193 See Ibid, p. 51  
194 See St John, 1993, p. 18 
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and mortgages195. The main purpose of the AS is to provide primary housing 
assistance to low-income renters, including both public and private housing, as well as 
home-owners. The AS benefit is available to both beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries196. The eligibility requirements of the recipients depend on whether or 
not the recipients’ housing costs exceed the entry threshold. However, the actual 
supplement received varies according to the regions the recipients live in, the 
recipients’ income and cash abatements197. For more information of the structure of 
the Accommodation Supplement since 1993, please refer to an appendix C. 
 
 
5.2.5 Working for Families (WFF) Package
 
WFF is a government program announced in the 2004 budget, designed to provide 
financial assistance to low to middle income families with children that are in work 
and therefore making it easier for these families to work and raise the families at the 
same time, ensuring income adequacy for New Zealander families198. Although WFF 
effectively started operating on 1st April 2005, it will be fully implemented in 
2007/08199 and is predicted to benefit families with children200. The reason why the 
government focuses on families with children as the main assistant recipients is 
because it is believed that once tax benefit abatement and other work related-costs are 
taken into account, many low income families with children are either no or only a 
little better off in low paid jobs. In turn, this could result in child poverty and 
negatively impact the low living standards on children over time201.  
 
 
WFF helps increase the income of families with children through the following 
channels. Firstly, Family Support (FS) payments are substantially increased202. Also, 
                                                 
195 See Boston et al, 1999, p. 221 
196 See St John, 1993, p. 18; Nolan, 2005, p. 274 
197 See Boston, op cit., p. 221 
198 See Dwyer, 2005, p. 1-2; Working for Families, 2004. http://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/media-
information/working-for-families/fact-sheet-1.pdf 
199 See Dwyer, op. cit., p. 4 
200 See Ibid, p. 7 
201 See Ibid, p. 2. 
202 Note that FS payments are available to both families with dependent child/ren that are both in work 
or on benefits. (Dwyer, 2005, p. 2) 
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some of these families will receive In-Work Payment (IWP), which replaces Child 
Tax Credit, entitling them to more benefits before they are abated, as long as they are 
in work. IWP is only available to parent couples who work for an aggregate of 30 
hours a week or single parents who work 20 hours203. Secondly, housing will become 
more affordable through more generous Accommodation Supplement (AS) via three 
channels- entry thresholds reduced by 10-20 percent, maximum level of payments 
increased up to 50 percent depending on the area and household composition and 
abatement thresholds increased by 8-20 percent204. Thirdly, larger proportions of 
parents will receive aid with child care costs through more generous pre-school and 
out of school subsidies. Lastly, the introduction of WFF also comes with more 
simplification of the government financial assistance through the welfare and tax 
system. Basically, more information will be made available so people now can find 
out what they are entitled to and how to use that entitlement more easily205.  
 
 
Once fully implemented, it is believed that the WFF package will provide financial 
assistance to a large proportion of NZ families with children, and hence, improve the 
living standard of these New Zealanders.  
 
However, WFF is not incorporated in this study, mainly because it was only 
introduced in 2004 and will not be fully implemented until 2007/08 and the data 
obtained from the HLFS at the time of this study is only up to the third quarter of 
2005. Therefore, in order to properly examine whether or not this WFF package has 
any impact on the marital and fertility decisions of New Zealand women, especially 
those with low income, would require a longer time frame in order to create a more 
substantial data set. The brief background of the WFF package included in this thesis 
is informative only. More information can be attained by reading a paper by Maloney 
and Fitzgerald (2007), which examines some of the short run impacts of WFF on 
partnering and employment. The authors model, partnering up and employment 
decision of New Zealand women as they are affected by the government payments, 
take into account the changes in policy that took place in 2005 and 2006. They found 
                                                 
203 See Dwyer, 2005, p. 2 
204 See Ibid, p. 2 
205 See Working for Families, 2004. 
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no evidence of any large impact of the family assistance policy changes on partnering 
decision.  
 
Chapter Summary
 
 
In summary, since 1986 the overall changes in the New Zealand’s welfare benefit and 
tax systems are as the following:  
     
     -   the income tax system has employed the progressive with a “broad-base, low-
rate” combination system. Generally, the tax rate of the lowest income bracket has 
been the same at 15%. However, the rates have been adjusted at the higher income 
brackets. 
      -  in the year 1991 most benefit rates were cut and the eligibility requirements 
were tightened. However, the abatement rates and the income exemption of these 
benefits programmes remained unchanged since the last adjustment in 1986. 
-   in the year 1996, most benefit programmes had changes to their abatement rates 
as well as the levels of the exempted income. 
- the changes over time to the DPBs include (i) changes in the work-test 
requirement in 1986 and 1998 and (ii) changes in the abatement regime in 1996. 
- although UB has been undergone a couple of reforms, the eligibility 
requirements have been by and large the same, however, the benefit rates were made 
more generous in 1991 and the abatement regime was adjusted in 1996 in such a way 
that a higher proportion of labour income can be kept before the entire level of UB 
benefits is ceased.  
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Graph 5.1: Composition of New Zealand’s tax base from 1981-2001
 
 Derived from Tax Review 2001 Final Report, 2001, p. 8 
 
 
Graph 5.2: Changes in the DPB’s Real Net Weekly Rates from 1986 to 2004
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Graph 5.3: Changes in Real UB net rates for beneficiaries without children
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Graph 5.4: Changes in the REAL rates of the UB for beneficiaries with children 
since 1986
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